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Japan is, as former Prime Minister Asō Tarō once put it, commonly described as being 
“one race, one civilization, one language and one culture.”1  This statement reflects a popular 
conception of Japan as a homogenous nation. However, the purpose of this paper, building on 
earlier research, is to assess what exactly Japanese identity is, how it is constructed/maintained, 
and who is and is not considered “Japanese.” The impetus of this inquiry comes from my 
research of the hisabetsu burakumin, a Japanese social outcaste group, who have undergone 
significant changes throughout their long history as a socially-constructed “minority.” This 
particular study of Japanese identity and its “Other” should help illuminate how ideology, 
discourse, and discrimination fuse with social institutions to create a means of self-identification 
and Other-identification. Using the particular cases of the Zainichi Koreans and the hisabetsu 
burakumin, I intend to analyze how different identities are incorporated into the larger social 
apparatus of Japanese society, which recognizes only one notion of “Japanese.” 
 
  
                                                          
1 "Asō Says Japan Is Nation of 'one Race' | The Japan Times." Japan Times RSS. Accessed October 22, 2017. 
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The Conceptual Framework for Deconstructing Ideology 
Identity is an integral part of human life, but it is an incredibly nuanced construct. The 
discourse concerning how individuals, communities, and nations construct identities involves a 
wide variety of facets including race/ethnicity, politics, philosophy, language, and culture. Given 
the breadth of the topic, I have narrowed in on the discourse concerning Japanese identity. What 
does it mean to be Japanese? How is the mainstream definition of Japanese identity 
produced/perpetuated by discourse and culture? In what way does this hegemonic identity relate 
to the identities of marginalized groups in Japan? Though there is an ever-present danger of 
ascribing either a monolithic or multicultural categorization or theory to Japanese society, I am 
not aiming to determine a definite explanation of Japanese identity or culture. Using the 
discourse of Nihonjinron and contemporary political and social theories, I will outline features of 
a mainstream Japanese identity to which I will relate the identities of various marginalized 
groups. To address these minority groups’ identities, the historical, cultural, racial/ethnic, and 
political dimensions of each group will be explored. I aim to demonstrate how these different 
identities are subsumed within the larger social apparatus of Japanese society, which recognizes 
only one notion of “Japanese,” but whose existence challenges Japanese cultural hegemony. 
 To investigate the matter of identity, we can begin by analyzing the related, but distinct, 
notion of Eric Hobsbawn’s “invented tradition.” The scholar Stephen Vlastos elaborates on 
Hobsbawn’s idea by detailing how traditions, like identities, are social constructs, meaning that 
their existence is dependent upon the societies and people that reify them through actualization.2 
However, one should not confuse the term “invented” with something that is entirely fictitious, 
                                                          
2 Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” in Mirror of Modernity: 
Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2. 
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without consequence, or without significance. Vlastos argues that scholars often frame the 
complexity of the term “tradition” itself within the timeframes to which they are relevant, 
created, and are used, as things opposite of modernity.3 Additionally, tradition is conceptualized 
as marking “the continuous cultural transmission” of the past to the present, by both individuals 
and structures.4 Yet, Hobsbawm outlines the term: “‘invented tradition’ is used in a broad, but 
not imprecise sense. It includes both ‘traditions’ actually invented, constructed and formally 
instituted and those emerging in a less easily traceable manner within a brief and dateable 
period…” which opposes the common conceptualizations of tradition by scholars.5 Instead of 
conceiving tradition as fixed social rituals and beliefs, Hobsbawm argues that traditions should 
be understand as social constructs intentionally invented by nations and peoples to create a sense 
of historical continuity and norms. 
 Another concept relevant to the discussion of identity as a product of cultural and social 
discourse is Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities.” For Anderson, the 
“imagined political community” is imagined as “both inherently limited and sovereign.”6 A 
community marks a particular spatial entity and incorporates a sense of communion that 
connects all of its members.7 Anything larger than a “primordial village” will fit the definition of 
“imagined community,” for it is the socio-political imagining of nation or space that is both finite 
and free.8 Lastly, it is a “community” because the nation is “always conceived as a deep, 
                                                          
3 Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” in Mirror of Modernity: 
Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2. 
4 Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” 2. 
5 Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
1. 
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (New York: Verso, 2006), 5-6. 
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (New York: Verso, 2006), 7. 
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horizontal comradeship,” a conceptualization that people are willing to die for.9 Anderson’s 
representation of social groups will map on well to the Nihonjinron discussion concerning 
national identity and culture. It is important to understand how the individual works that 
constitute the Nihonjinron discourse are indicative of a larger enterprise of imaging a national 
Japanese political entity. 
 The discourse of Nihonjinron requires particular analysis, for much of the scholarship 
concerning Japanese identity relates in some way to the body of work, both Japanese and 
foreign, commonly designated under the umbrella-term of “Nihonjinron.”10 Though national 
studies is not something unique to Japan or the Japanese, the Nihonjinron discourse is marked by 
scholars as a particular subset of nationalistic scholarship.11 The history of the discourse is by no 
means inconsequential to the aim of this paper, for the discourse of Nihonjinron is not limited to 
academic circles or institutions but is instead a commonly engaged activity in mainstream 
Japanese society.12 However, there is a noteworthy concern to raise when discussing the 
Nihonjinron discourse as it is in many ways a prime example of Hobsbawn’s concept of 
“invented tradition.” 
 In simply separating Nihonjinron from other national studies, one emphasizes a particular 
discourse peculiar only to Japan. Whether scholars, Japanese and non-Japanese, attempt to affirm 
or deny the various claims of the Nihonjinron discourse, their partaking in the conversation 
perpetuates its ideas as an existing discursive body.13 This reification of Nihonjinron by even its 
                                                          
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7. 
10 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater, 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-2. 
11 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), i-ii. 
12 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, 2-3. 
13 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), i-ii. 
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detractors creates an interesting dilemma when addressing the notion of Japanese identity. If we 
are to use a representation of Japanese identity derived from the Nihonjinron discourse, then are 
we affirming all or parts of this particularly troublesome body of work? However, we cannot 
begin to develop an idea of Japanese identity completely separate from the discourse of 
Nihonjinron given the prevalence and influence the discourse has had in the formation of 
perceptions of Japanese societal norms and ideology. 
 More complications arise when we consider that any essentialist perspective of Japanese 
identity requires a conscious disregard of actual human variance.14 Using representations or 
attempting to articulate a representation of an entire people requires critical consideration, lest I 
present an egregiously inaccurate portrayal or engage in some sort of paternalistic, Orientalist, or 
racist scholarship. Therefore, even though I will employ models of identity for various groups 
living in Japan, I do not assert that these models constitute a kind of absolute “reality” or “truth.” 
Edward Said, a postcolonial studies scholar and renowned public intellectual, presents an 
argument for why scholars ought to be careful when “representing others” in his book 
Orientalism: 
…the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or 
whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first 
in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the 
presenter. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is), then we must be 
prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, 
embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the “truth,” that is itself a 
representation.15  
The purpose of representations in this paper is to analyze the cultural construction of identity by 
both mainstream Japanese society and various marginalized groups. Tradition, or culture, and 
                                                          
14 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 222. 
15 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 272-273. 
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identity are tied in that even if they are invented or representations, they form a very tangible and 
very real basis for social-political structures and ideology. 
An example par excellence of this is former Japanese Prime Minister, Asō Tarō’s (name 
in Japanese order of [surname, given name]) image of Japan as “one race, one civilization, one 
language and one culture,” a representation that has been left mainly unchallenged in both 
Japanese and Western popular discourse.16 Furthermore, the Western conception of Japan as a 
xenophobic and homogenous nation, perpetuates a narrative of Japan that downplays, 
overgeneralizes, or completely ignores internal differences. Yet, Japan is, I argue with John Lie, 
a nation constituted of various peoples, civilizations, languages, and cultures. The Ainu of 
Hokkaido, the Ryūkyūan of Okinawa, the Zainichi Koreans, and the hisabetsu burakumin, 
among others, have a stake in Japan’s national identity. 
To elaborate on this particular representation, a homogenous society is a society that is 
uniform in structure and lacking or devoid of difference.17 The Japan described by former Prime 
Minister Asō’s statement portrays a unified, monolithic nation, which perpetuates a cultural 
hegemonic representation that subsumes differences. However, the issue is not that Japan claims 
to be homogenous when it is not, but the claim that “Japaneseness” is something devoid of 
difference and identified solely with mainstream society. To downplay group variance is to make 
invisible what society finds undesirable and enforces silence on marginalized communities, 
preventing them from expressing their differences in the foreground. This was the reality for the 
Ainu, native Okinawans, and various other marginalized groups, who were subjected to 
assimilatory polices and forced to adhere to a concept of “Japaneseness” that only alienated them 
                                                          
16 "Aso Says Japan Is Nation of 'one Race' | The Japan Times." Japan Times RSS. Accessed July 22, 2016.  
17 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “homogeneous.” 
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further.18 Ethnic and cultural minorities had to deal with the reality that to be “non-Japanese” 
meant to be peripheral, on the margins of society. The hisabetsu burakumin, the largest minority 
group in Japan, in particular have been delegated to the fringes of Japanese society constantly 
throughout Japanese history, though they are not “ethnically” different from other Japanese 
people.19 
Since this paper discusses the issues of discrimination, the reader should note that 
discrimination itself is a complicated term and refers to a basic, universal human activity. To 
“discriminate” means to differentiate things, ideas, people, places, and so forth on the basis of 
available information.20 For example, one can discriminate between types of fruit or herbs based 
on available or obtainable information that in turn is influenced by societal indoctrination, 
personal biases, and accessibility. However, this definition is not challenged per se in this paper, 
instead the ideology of social/racial discrimination and its connection to social structures, 
attitudes, and behaviors that separate and classify people into different categories of social 
positionality is. An ideology of discrimination is to be understood as an underlying and pervasive 
cultural lens of stratification/differentiation that affects the way people of a particular society or 
group behave and think without necessarily being aware of it. Ideology shapes how people 
engage with and understand cultural symbols, meanings, and values concerning people, objects, 
places, and ideas.21 Relevant to this conceptual framework is the term “Other,” which refers to a 
type of group classification that designates a collective as being alien or different, normally in 
                                                          
18 Joshua H. Roth, "Blackwell Reference Online." CHAPTER 6. Political and Cultural Perspectives on "Insider" 
Minorities: A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan, Accessed July 22, 2016, 74-76. Doi: 
10.1111/b.9780631229551.2008.00006.x 
19 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 6-7. 
20 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “discriminate.” 
21 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, s.v. “ideology.” 
Lopez-Duran 9 
 
relation to a dominate group. All nations and cultures have their “Others,” for they provide a 
means for creating collective identity and association, which entail a host of interconnected 
social consequences like social formation, accessibility of resources, and imposed societal values 
and meanings.22  
Before analyzing the Nihonjinron, I want to bring up the discussion concerning the 
multicultural and multiethnic conceptions of Japan. The scholar Chris Burgess argues that 
critiques of Japan’s “homogenous conception of Japan” and those who advocate a “multicultural 
image of Japan” fail to see how cultural variance does not equate to multiculturalism.23 The 
cultural hegemony of a particular notion of “Japaneseness” subsumes any cultural variance and 
the lack of a cultural-equal to Japanese culture is indicative of this assured dominance.24 Burgess 
argues that “…we can say that, on balance, Japan does not appear to be particularly multicultural 
in terms of either discourse (1.2.1), policy (1.2.2), or people (1.2.3)...This begs the question of 
whether those writing in the ‘multicultural Japan’ vein are not being descriptive but rather 
prescriptive: not saying what Japan is like but what it should, ought to, or must be like.”25 To 
engage the discourse of Japan in a prescriptive way betrays a scholar’s ability to represent Japan 
as is, not as one wants to represent it as, which is an Orientalist activity. And I agree with 
Burgess’ assessment of Japan, for despite the cultural variance in Japan, the hegemony of 
mainstream Japanese culture is irreconcilable with the principles of multiculturalism. 
                                                          
22 Edward W Said, Orientalism, (Vintage Books A Division of Random House: New York, 1978), 1-4. 
23 Chris Burgess, “Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the ‘Myth’ of Homogeneity,” Asia-Pacific Journal 5 (March 
2007), http://apjjf.org/-Chris-Burgess/2389/article.html (accessed April 23, 2018). 
24 Chris Burgess, “Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the ‘Myth’ of Homogeneity,” Asia-Pacific Journal 5 (March 
2007), http://apjjf.org/-Chris-Burgess/2389/article.html (accessed April 23, 2018). 
25 Chris Burgess, “Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the ‘Myth’ of Homogeneity,” Asia-Pacific Journal 5 (March 




However, if Japan is neither a homogenous nor multicultural nation, then what 
description is more fitting? While I do not think that any concept fully encapsulate every nuance 
and facet of Japanese social structure and cultural dynamics, I agree with the sociologist John Lie 
in arguing that Japan is a multiethnic state.26 For Lie, the monoethnic myth was created post-
World War II by nationalistic historiographers and nationalists imposing a view of Japan as 
monoethnic from beginning to the present27. The political mobilization of ethnic minorities in 
recent years is not indicative of a shift from monoethnic to multiethnic, but, Lie argues, is a re-
assertion of the “truth” that Japan has always been multiethnic.28 While cultural hegemony still 
persists, minority social activism inherently challenges and deconstructs the perception of Japan 
as homogenous or monolithic, for rooting “the monoethnic ideology in Japan in national 
character or something deeper is not only contrary to historical fact; it does little to inform efforts 
to challenge it.”29 And these challenges shape the social landscape of the nation from one of 
homogeneity to heterogeneity, not because of multiculturalism but because of ethnic variance. 
“Being Japanese:” Exploring Facets of Nihonjinron Discourse 
 Japanese identity, like all national identities, entails interwoven facets of environmental, 
cultural, ethnic, and linguistic factors.30 For this purpose, Nihonjinron “日本人論,” despite its 
controversial status, provides a comprehensive body of work that presents invaluable reflections 
by various Japanese writers. Though there is a large amount of non-Japanese work concerning 
Nihonjinron, I will attempt to limit or contextualize those sources differently from how I will try 
                                                          
26 John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 5. 
27 John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, 141.  
28 John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, 141. 
29 John Lie, Multiethnic Japan, 182-183. 
30 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater, 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 16. 
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to treat the Japanese sources. Rather than concern myself with which writers are more accurate 
or less prejudicial, I think it is important to create a conception of Japanese identity that is largely 
founded on Japanese perspectives as opposed to non-Japanese perspectives. 
Outlining the identity of Japanese marginalized groups is equally difficult given the 
complexity of their respective histories. Therefore, I will narrow down my focus in this paper to 
examining the groups of the Zainichi Koreans and hisabetsu burakumin. How exactly are these 
groups distinguished from mainstream Japanese society? How have their identities been changed 
and fixed by the groups’ relation to mainstream Japanese identity? Does the existence of these 
marginalized communities confirm or deny conceptualizing Japan as a homogenous state, a 
multicultural state, or a multiethnic state? And furthermore, from analyzing the current state of 
these marginalized groups, can we situate their future within Japanese society? 
Identity is not a completely fixed construction, but an ever-changing, living 
construction.31 The misconception of perceiving identity as something set in stone is the reason 
why neither the monolithic nor multicultural representation of Japan are accurate, though I will 
address this in further detail later. Societies, groups, and individuals construct their own 
identities, but they also adhere to and reflect the prevalent social constructs of their particular 
society and social groups.32 For this reason, Nihonjinron should not be perceived as some fixed 
body of work, but an ever-expanding body of identity literature, a living discourse. And as the 
French philosopher Michel Foucault noted, a discourse cannot be easily separated from the social 
network of power that it is embedded into.33 
                                                          
31 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1998), 6. 
32 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, 5-6. 
33 Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power, and the Subject, (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997), 21. 
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Nihonjinron, as mentioned previously, is the categorization of a body of work comprising 
various “theories” relating to Japanese cultural and racial uniqueness.34 The anthropologist 
Harumi Befu argues that it is difficult to translate Nihonjinron into English because even though 
the term “論” has various readings, the common de facto translation of “theory” implies an 
image of a well-researched, scholarly work.35 For the purposes of this paper, the phrase 
“discourse” will be used as it provides a more comprehensive connotation and is less tied to 
scholarly implications. Befu notes that Nihonjinron writing has become something of a 
“pastime” in Japan and something to which many writers, academic and otherwise, contribute 
material.36 Instead of distinguishing between what is and what is not academic writing, Befu 
argues that all work related to Nihonjinron comprise its body and engage a discourse often seen 
as exclusive to scholars.37 Though Befu’s argument increases the sheer volume of texts one 
might research, it also decreases the rigor or scholarly standards of said work, and his claim 
allows for an analysis of Japanese identity as perceived and constructed by Japanese people, not 
just scholars but non-scholars as well. 
Peter Dale, another anthropologist, however, argues that analyzing the Nihonjinron 
discourse requires the separation of non-scholarly work from scholarly work.38 Dale is concerned 
with addressing the “fictional mentality” that is Nihonjinron, which he claims was constructed by 
numerous thinkers and writers over an extended period of Japan’s history.39 Dale rejects the idea 
                                                          
34 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater, 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2-3. 
35 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, 2. 
36 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, 3. 
37 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater, 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2. 
38 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), i. 
39 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, ii. 
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of Nihonjinron being a “national ‘mentality’” or a way of thinking that is deeply connected to the 
complex and interwoven meld of social and economic institutions and mechanisms.40 For Dale, 
an analysis of Nihonjinron means undertaking the task of unraveling the various perplexing 
aspects of Nihonjinron’s wide body of work.41 One must struggle, Dale argues, with the paradox 
of a Japanese identity that asserts its own uniqueness while simultaneously denying the 
uniqueness of the people who call themselves “Japanese.”42 
Both of these scholars offer us a considerable amount of evidence to consider regarding 
the exact nature of the Nihonjinron discourse. However, whether we reject it as pure fiction or 
use it to assess a very real sense of Japanese identity depends on not only the works analyzed but 
a stance on the purpose of national studies in general. To this end, the Japanese government’s 
Ministry of Education in 1937 published the first issue of a document titled Kokutai no Hongi 
“国体の本義” or “Cardinal Principles of the National Entity.” This particular work is known for 
presenting a comprehensive view of Japanese identity that conformed every area of life into a 
single, cohesive national identity.43 Given that this document was officially sanctioned by the 
Japanese government it provides a framework for understanding how the modern, pre-World 
War II Japanese state attempted to define the discourse of Nihonjinron and how Japanese 
academics assisted in the venture. It is important to note that the whole discourse is greater than 
any one document, but constructing and deconstructing Japanese identity requires first some 
model of how the identity is represented on a national scale. Following this, I will use Dale and 
                                                          
40 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, ii. 
41 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, iii. 
42 Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, 22. 
43 Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), (excerpt). 
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Befu’s opposing views to further contextualize the nature of the discourse while also addressing 
several of the concerns both scholars raise regarding the analysis of Nihonjinron. 
Does a government-sanctioned document provide an objective or comprehensive 
representation of Japanese identity? While it is important to recognize the potential biases 
inherent in such a representation, it does comprise but one of the many interpretations of how 
Japanese people have come to perceive themselves and understand their particular uniqueness in 
human history. Rather than conceptualize this, however, as a completely fictional account with 
no bearing on reality, like Dale, we should instead focus on how identity operates as a reified 
representation of selfhood and culture. Though I will illustrate later how the dismissive approach 
of Dale fails to recognize how identity operates within society and for individuals as well as how 
the issue of Orientalism has structured the discourse of Nihonjinron from the beginning. 
In analyzing excerpts from the Kokutai no Hongi, one can recognize the propagandistic 
elements of the document that were intended to instill a sense of national cohesion as well as 
provide an explanation of what it means to be “Japanese.”44 Though this relation is tied to the 
nation-state and the emperor, who embodies the state, we see how Japanese identity is associated 
with participation in the Japanese political-military complex and loyalty to the agenda and 
programs of the Japanese Empire.45 What occurs within the document itself is an investigation 
by its authors into how the “unrest” in the lives of the Japanese citizens is due to the nature of 
Occidental ideologies and a lack of understanding of the “true meaning” of the national polity.46 
Defining Japanese identity by characteristics such as patriotism and loyalty creates an image of a 
                                                          
44 Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), (excerpt). 
45 Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, (). 
46 Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, (). 
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civic identity, something which connects one’s personhood to a particular polity.47 Opposing the 
“Occident” likewise invokes the image of an “East” versus “West” depiction of human history, 
in which two dissimilar, but ultimately linked, human spheres are in a state of constant 
contention due to irreconcilable differences in their nature.48 
Said, however, would counter that the use of the fictional “East” and “West” dichotomy 
problematizes the actuality of Japan’s history and its relation to the world, for despite its 
isolation, it was always connected to and engaged with said world.49 The Kokutai no Hongi is a 
particularly useful document for analyzing how the Japanese state synthesized Japanese identity 
and constructed a cohesive, national narrative. However, Befu argues that the Nihonjinron 
discourse has been fairly accessible to a larger demographic than the Kokutai no Hongi might 
imply, especially since the decrease in government restrictions after World War II and the 
American occupation (1945-1952).50 For Befu, Japanese identity, as constructed by writers of 
Nihonjinron, is a living, fluid process reflective of Japanese society and indicative of a reified 
cultural and self-understanding.51 The difference between Dale’s view and the notion presented 
by Hobsbawn is that the former does not recognize how social constructs represent or adhere to 
people’s living experience and own self-understanding. Hobsbawn, however, grounds said 
reification as a common human activity that forms the basis of creating what we call cultural or 
national “tradition,” and by extension identity.52 
                                                          
47 Robert K. Hall and John O, Gauntlett. Kokutai No Hongi, (). 
48 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 54. 
49 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 54. 
50 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater, 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 
51 Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron, trans. by David Slater, 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-4. 
52 Stephen Vlastos, “Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History,” in Mirror of Modernity: 
Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 3. 
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 What we are presented with is an argument between two perceptions of social constructs: 
1) that constructs have no actual bearing on reality, but work only within a theoretical or abstract 
framework, thereby masking “truth”; 2) that constructs inform, reflect, and shape social and self-
understanding and identity. While Dale holds that the discourse is a purely “fictional” body of 
literature, in his own engagement of the subject, Dale reifies it as something which can be 
addressed. Said notes that while we use representations of things, places, people, and so forth in 
shaping our particular understanding of said subject, we run the risk of substituting the 
representation for the actual, living subject.53 When addressing the topic of Nihonjinron from an 
approach grounded in its own assurance of the subject’s paradoxical and incoherent logical 
structure, we transform the subject of “Japanese identity” into an object, abstract from and 
devoid of its actual human components.54 Analyzing the Nihonjinron discourse is not a matter of 
unraveling or unmasking the “myth of Japanese uniqueness,” as Dale titled his text, in order to 
uncover a “true” Japanese identity nor is it a means for psychoanalyzing why a whole people 
believe in their own personal and national uniqueness. 
The primary concern of this analysis is neither to conform to a notion that affirms 
particular views within the discourse nor denies the bearing that Nihonjinron has on Japanese 
identity and society. If we accept Said’s premise, we must also recognize that the shaping of 
Japanese identity has occurred over the course of Japan’s historical process and is thus a 
discourse related to Western imperialism and Orientalism, a discourse of disparate power 
dynamics.55 While it might appear as if though Japanese people’s insistence on Japanese 
uniqueness is easily refutable, we ought to recognize that Nihonjinron concerns only one 
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particular discourse and that national studies is a common activity of peoples in all nations. The 
discourse of Japanese identity does not comprise only negations of “not being Western,” 
Japanese identity has been affected by its own “self-Orientalization,” or acceptance of Orientalist 
thinking from non-Japanese and Japanese alike.56 Nihonjinron presents how writers negotiate 
identity within a national community and in relation to intercultural/international interactions. 
While Dale’s approach to Nihonjinron is dismissive of its ability to represent individual 
and national identity, one should continue to consider Dale’s argument of how national identity 
can subsume individual uniqueness.57 The Kokutai no Hongi frames Japanese identity within a 
political context, but how is it constructed in relation to other factors? For the purposes of 
illustrating how Japanese identity is constructed in relation to ecology, social structure, language, 
culture and race/ethnicity, I will employ anthropologists Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s Re-Inventing 
Japan: Time, Space, Nation and Befu’s Hegemony of Homogeneity. Both of these scholars 
synthesize a variety of Nihonjinron texts to present how Japanese identity has been constructed 
within the discourse. 
The Japan of Nihonjinron: Ecology, Social Structure, Language, Culture, and Race 
Part 1: Ecological Nihonjinron 
How exactly is the environment connected to how groups and nations develop national 
identity? Within the Nihonjinron discourse, Befu notes how the view of Japan as a “resource-
poor nation with frequent natural calamities” is a popular conception of Japan.58 Such an image 
is derived from a discourse formed by a variety of Nihonjinron writers who argue that there is an 
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“inextricable relationship between that geography and the cultural life of the Japanese.”59 
Watsuji Tetsurō’s Fūdo is an example par excellence of this view and has been a rather 
influential Nihonjinron text, often referenced by numerous other Nihonjinron writers.60 Instead 
of simply accounting for how the weather affects Japanese culture, Watsuji focuses on how the 
environment is the cause or basis for aspects of Japanese culture.61  
In his text, Watsuji classifies Eurasia into three ecological types: monsoon, desert, and 
pastoral.62 Of these three distinct types, Watsuji argues that Japan resides in the monsoon belt, 
though its exact position also exposes it to the effects of the Artic air.63 This specific 
combination of warm and cold, wet and dry, climate facilitated “Japan’s wet rice cultivation and 
family structure to its national character, ethos, and esthetics.”64 Even Japan’s open architecture 
is conceptualized as reflective of the Japanese people’s need to adapt to the climate of their 
environment.65 Working upon this notion, Watsuji continues to formulate how even the absence 
of privacy, denial of individual rights, and promotion of collective orientation, derived from the 
architecture, are linked to the environment.66 
Befu notes how Watsuji’s systemic approach to culture and environment was further 
elaborated by other ecologically-oriented Nihonjinron writers such as Chikamatsu Yoshiyuki, 
Kimata Tokou, and Tsukiyama Jisaburō. Another ecological writer, Kōyama Iwao, also argues 
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that “Japanese sensitivity toward nature” is derived from the “physical conditions of Japan.”67 To 
Kōyama, the Japanese “love of miniature and miniaturization,” manifested in such things as 
haiku poetry, fifteen syllable poems, and bonsai gardening, planting pot-sized landscapes and 
vegetation, is linked to the small size of Japan itself.68 Additionally, in rural Japan, the corporate 
group structure is also linked to the wet-rice cultivation induced by the “closed nature” of the 
village environment.69 Furthermore, Kōyama argues that the environment is responsible for 
“Japanese optimism, this-worldly character, fusion of art and life, and even patriotism.”70 
The link between Japan’s environment and Japanese psychology is a topic elaborated by 
psychologist Miyagi Otoya. Miyagi notes that the “harsh, destructive environment” facilitated 
the formation of a particular mentality and certain personality types among Japanese people.71 In 
contrast to the West’s conquest of nature, Miyagi argues that the Japanese merely tried to adapt 
to their environment, which he sees as manifestations of sadism and masochism respectively.72 
This direct “environment-to-personality argument” was later changed by Miyagi to include a 
component detailing how personality is “mediated through living conditions (‘food, shelter, and 
clothing’).”73 Befu clarifies that the particular argument presented by Kōyama and Miyagi, 
among others, is representative of a negative approach of Nihonjinron, for it emphasizes negative 
ecological conditions like “the smallness of the island nation and the cold and harsh climate.”74 
In contrast, Chikamatsu characterizes Japan’s climate as “‘mild (on’wa),’ ‘subtle (himyō),’ and 
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‘delicate (sensai).’”75 This type of environment, Chikamatsu argues, creates a “unique literary 
esthetic…with its distinct sense of seasonality” manifested excellently in haiku poetry.76 This 
“basically benign” image of Japan’s environment is another part of the ecologically-oriented 
Nihonjinron discourse.77 Though determining which approach is more “truthful” is outside the 
scope of this paper, Befu’s analysis illustrates how writers derive and relate culture and identity 
to their particular environment.  
Morris-Suzuki provides another analysis of how the environment is used for creating 
specific narratives tying people to their environment and explaining cultural phenomena. Instead 
of just mapping out the ecologically-oriented aspect of Nihonjinron, Morris-Suzuki concentrates 
on how writers and peoples use discourse-derived imagery to form national boundaries and 
identities.78 The vision of a national landscape forms an integral basis for individual and national 
identity, for example U.S. citizens conceive of their nation in geographical terms as illustrated by 
the lyrics of the patriotic song “America the Beautiful.”79 The national images depicted in 
cultural works such as songs, poetry, literature, and so forth produce a geographical space which 
“houses” the nation.80  
As explored above, a variety of writers and scholars in Japan have outlined the 
relationship between culture and environment, fashioning a geographical space known as 
“Japan” in the process. Morris-Suzuki notes how the anthropologist Ishida Eiichirō defined “the 
essence of Japanese culture in terms of a unique national feeling for nature.”81 This sentiment is 
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echoed by the archaeologist Yasuda Yoshinori, who argued that “mountain forests” are a 
defining feature of Japanese culture.82 For Yasuda, Europe represents a civilization oriented 
around deforestation while Japan is a civilization oriented around forests.83 Both the policies and 
measures taken by the Japanese state and people to preserve natural landscapes as well as Shintō 
beliefs are evidence for Yasuda of a civilization that is intimately connected to its forest 
environment.84 Yasuda argues that the coexistence between Japan and its environment can 
become a model for other nations to harmonize with their environment and move away from a 
conflict-orientated relationship with nature.85 
The historian Lynn White also argues that Japan’s relationship with nature is harmonious 
and different from Western attitudes.86 White attributes Christian theology in the West with 
perpetuating a mentality of humanity versus nature.87 In the Eastern religions/beliefs, such as 
Zen Buddhism, White sees humans as integrated as equals, and part of, a “wider natural order.”88 
Japan became associated with an image of a society that exists in harmony with nature and any 
potential corruption of such an image is explained away by blaming Western influence.89 Though 
Morris-Suzuki is skeptical of such an interpretation, seeing as Japan was able to adapt itself to 
industrialization processes introduced by Western nations without being tied to the ideological 
framework espoused by ecologically-oriented Nihonjinron writers.90 Instead of focusing on the 
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conflict between actual historical processes and discursive processes, we can assess how national 
narratives and identities are continually perpetuated in spite of such discrepancies. 
To illustrate this point, Morris-Suzuki also analyzes Watsuji’s Fūdo and the way in which 
it framed the creation of Japanese cultural works as a byproduct of Japanese society’s 
relationship to nature. Just as Befu noted Watsuji’s ecological classifications and his view of 
Japan as a mixture of monsoon and Artic conditions, Morris-Suzuki argues that Watsuji 
formulated a synthesis capable of incorporating the changing relation between Japanese culture 
and the environment.91 Not only did Watsuji argue that the climate of Japan created “a distinctive 
and complex sensitivity to nature, vividly represented in Japanese art, architecture, and 
literature,” but he derived a Japanese character or mentality from the environment.92  
The climate’s components, Artic and monsoon, mentioned by both Befu and Morris-
Suzuki is the foundation of Watsuji’s vision of Japanese human relationships.93 Watsuji states: 
In these conditions of powerful sunlight and plentiful moisture, tropical plants flourish 
here in abundance. The summer landscape hardly differs from that of the tropics. Its 
outstanding representative is rice. On the other hand, the cold weather and lower moisture 
of winter means that the plants of the cold regions flourish in equal abundance. Their 
chief representative is wheat. So the wide earth is covered in winter with wheat and 
winter grasses, and in summer with rice and summer grasses. But those plants that do not 
change with the seasons must embody duality within their own forms. The sight of the 
tropical bamboo weighed down with snow is often cited as a symbol of the Japanese 
landscape, but the bamboo, which has learned to bear the weight of snow, is itself 
different from the tropical bamboo. It has turned into Japanese bamboo, which is flexible 
and can be drawn with a curved line.94 
This is illustrative of how a geographical space is depicted and how characteristics identified 
with a nation and people are derived. Watsuji characterizes the duality of Japan’s climate, and 
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likewise the Japanese people, as a mixture of “passion and calm, flexibility and strength.”95 
Japan is neither wholly monsoon climate nor Artic climate, it is instead a mixture that 
incorporates both into a unique existence.96 Just like the “tropical bamboo” becomes “Japanese 
bamboo,” so too are the elements of Japanese culture never simply native or foreign, they 
become Japanese through their incorporation into Japanese culture.97 Such is the connection 
between being and space as depicted in Watsuji’s Fūdo, a text which Morris-Suzuki argues still 
exerts a notable appeal and influence since the eighteenth-century in Japanese perceptions of 
Japan as a “spatial entity.”98 
 The analysis of Japan’s environmental conditions helps illustrate a notion of Japanese 
identity that does not originate from the kind of historical-political context of the Kokutai no 
Hongi. The ecological aspect of the Nihonjinron discourse provides an imagery and framework 
capable of depicting a national identity and narrative. The “spatial entity” that is known as 
“Japan” and Japanese culture itself are perceived as the products of their environmental 
conditions. While the claim that Japanese culture reflects Japan’s natural environment is 
understandable, the formation of a national imagery depends upon the representation of the 
human-nature relationship in culture as much as it does on the actual human-nature relationship. 
Likewise, Morris-Suzuki’s criticism of writers who overlook Japan’s industrialization and 
continued encroachment of natural spaces illustrates the tension between the discourse of 
Nihonjinron and actual historical changes.99 
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Part 2: Japan’s Social Structure in Nihonjinron 
 While the ecological approach to Nihonjinron provides us with an understanding of 
national identity that is linked to a geographical spaces, the formation of social structures 
provides another discursive approach for understanding Japanese identity. A component of the 
social structure Nihonjinron discourse is the role of Japan’s “subsistence economy.” Focusing on 
writers such as Sabata Toyoyuki, Tamaki Akira, and Tsukuba Hisaharu, Befu notes how these 
writers, among others, accept the truism that wet-rice cultivation necessitated the formation of 
Japan’s “village corporacy.”100 According to Tamaki, the intensive agricultural activities of 
ancient Japan required cooperation and facilitated the creation of tightly-knit, perhaps even 
“oppressively tyrannical,” communities which demanded “conformity, consensus, and 
cooperation” and did not allow members to express “individuality or assert their rights.”101 To 
belong to a village, oriented around wet-rice cultivation, meant being part of a greater collective 
around which one’s identity was oriented, if not even founded upon. 
 To further elaborate this discussion, Befu analyzes another common point of comparison 
that writers use for contrasting Japan with “the West,” the discussion of the “pastoral economy” 
versus the “agrarian economy.”102 According to this argument, the pastoral economy prevailed in 
the West and facilitated the roots of “individualism” by placing importance on the individual 
ownership of herds and grazing land.103 This inversely impeded the formation of the “oppressive 
corporate community and corporate family structure” required for wet-rice cultivation.104 In the 
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more agriculturally-inclined farming communities of Japan, the corporate village fostered amae 
“甘え” or the Japanese propensity for “psychological interdependence” and the “closely knit 
kindship units of Japan.”105 Developing upon these theories, the Ishida Eiichirō argued that the 
pastoral economy is responsible for the monotheism of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, which 
all arose in a “pastoral context,” and forms a fundamental component of the nature of European 
civilization and the “core personality” of Europeans themselves.106 Writers like Ishida, Araki, 
and Iwasaki, argue that in contrast to Western individualism, derived from the pastoral economy, 
the Japanese agrarian economy formed the basis of Japan’s group-orientation.107 
 This particular aspect of Japanese culture, its supposed “group-orientation,” is one of the 
more popularly known images of Japanese society. Japan’s “groupism,” as Befu puts it or 
“collectivism,” has been used as a model by numerous scholars for studying topics such as 
Japanese family structure, master-disciple relationships in martial arts, Japanese company 
organization, and so forth.108 The political scientist, Nobutaka Ike argued that to understand the 
political processes of Japan requires a prior understanding of Japanese group-orientated 
behavior.109  Yet, while there are many Japanese scholars and writers who use this salient feature 
of Japanese culture in their own works, the popular acceptance by Western scholars and publics 
has had a role in perpetuating this particular social ideology.110 Collectivism is translated as 
shūdan shugi “集団主義” in Japanese, though it has a much more neutral connotation than the 
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English term.111 While Japan is conceptualized as a “collectivist” nation, the West is seen as a 
predominantly “individualistic” sphere. The term for individualism in Japanese is kojin shugi “個
人主義” which strongly implies “selfishness and egotism at the expense of others.”112 Yet, while 
the English term “collectivism” denotes an Orientalist conceptualization of Japan, which 
likewise fuels self-Orientalization by Nihonjinron writers who uncritically accept Western ideas, 
the Japanese term kojin shugi is a by-product of the similar process of Japan being defined and 
defining itself as the opposite of the West.113 
 Whether one derives Japan’s “collectivism” from the environment, subsistence economy, 
or from rural origins, Befu notes that one is engaging in a popular exercise among Nihonjinron 
writers.114 Watsuji Tetsurō likewise writes in regards to Japanese social structure, though not 
identically to writers like Iwasaki Takaharu, Kenmochi Takehiko, or Tamaki Akira who derive 
collectivism as explained above. Watsuji does not derive, as Befu puts it “in a casual sense,” the 
corporate community from wet-rice cultivation, but he does consider Japan’s kinship system of 
ie “家,” or family/household, to be “monsoonish” in nature.115 Watsuji relates the ecological 
aspect of Nihonjinron to the socio-political dimension of the discourse, for Watsuji connects the 
ie to the state by arguing how filial piety in the former is akin to national loyalty in the latter. 
Extending this further, one is a member of the ie, the most immediate totality, and the state, the 
ultimate totality, represented by the emperor, to whom one owes loyalty.116 Thus, society is 
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“structured” like a family and all the subjects of the nation must ultimately be loyal to the 
emperor, who is the head of the nation. Though this particular line of argumentation adheres 
more to Anderson’s conception of “imagined community” than it does to the collectivism 
discourse. 
 What Watsuji’s approach demonstrates is that the approach to topics by Nihonjinron 
writers are as varied as the people writing, for Befu notes how other writers like Inuta Mitsuru, 
Kawamoto Akira, and Maniwa Mitsuyuki do not derive Japan’s group-orientation from Japan’s 
rural background either.117 Among these other writers, Nakane Chie is known for her work 
Japanese Society which sets down the defining criteria of Japanese groups, which Befu 
summarizes as: 
(1) the notion of ‘frame,’ which she defines as ‘a criterion that sets a boundary and gives 
a common basis to a set of individuals who are allocated to or involved in it, (2) the 
predominance of vertical relationships, (3) exclusivity of membership, that is, one 
belongs to one and only one group, and (4) hostility toward outsiders.118 
From this set of criteria, one is intended to conceptualize Japanese social groups as rigid, 
defined, and localized. Inuta contrasts group-orientated societies and individualistic societies, 
noting how the latter emphasizes “individual rights, duties, and conscience” while the former is 
absent of these characteristics.119 To be a member of a group in Japanese society is to 
continuously impose upon each other, for this is what defines one’s identity and membership to a 
“desinty-sharing corporate community” or unmei kyōdōutai “運命共同体.”120 
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 In order to further elaborate how membership is actualized within the discourse of 
Japanese society, Befu analyzes the psychological interdependence of Japanese hierarchically-
organized groups through the concept of amae. According to Befu, within an organization, the 
“paternalistic leader” of an organization serves to “satisfy both the affective and the instrumental 
needs of the organization’s members.”121 Subordinates seek “emotional satisfaction by prevailing 
and depending upon their social superiors” and the reverse of superior to subordinate dependence 
constitute the dynamics of the vertical organization of Japanese social groups.122 Amae itself is 
etiologically connected back to the mother-child relationship, which is seen as the core of the 
socialization process in Japan.123 When discussing the normative practices of Japanese social 
relations, it is important to discuss the concepts of on “恩” and giri “義理” which respectively 
translate to “indebtedness” and “duty.”124 Within the dynamics of superior-subordinate, the 
“instrumental and expressive provision” given by a superior becomes a sense of on for the 
subordinate.125 This then creates a “normative obligation” that is a moral imperative of repaying 
one’s debt or fulfilling one’s giri, often expressed by a subordinate through loyal service to a 
superior.126 
 As a consequence of the relationship dynamic explored above, Japanese social virtues 
emphasizes harmony, cooperation, and conformity while traits and behaviors relating to open-
conflict and competition are taboo.127 Social ritual and behavior are oriented around reducing, if 
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not fully eliminating, open-conflict and embarrassment. Actions and characteristics adversely 
affecting the total mutual affective satisfaction among members are sanctioned via ostracism, 
shame, and other means.128 The ideal form of social groups then is having all members selflessly 
oriented around the goals of the group with virtuous superiors and devoted subordinates. While 
there might be many commonalities between this ideal and other cultures’ ideals, this particular 
notion arises from the context of the Nihonjinron discourse. 
 The notion of collectivism or shūdan shugi, however, is not completely unchallenged in 
the Japanese Nihonjinron discourse, for sociologist Hamaguchi Eshun focuses on a concept 
called “contextualism” or kanjin shugi “肝心主義” or aidagara shugi “間柄主義.”129 This 
conceptualizes the individual in manner that emphasizes their “total situation” as a basic unit of 
society rather than stripping a person down to their individual self.130 Thus, the methodology for 
analyzing Japan through either an individualistic or collectivist approach is already marred with 
“methodological individualism” which distorts people’s understanding of Japan’s social 
structure.131  
The issue for Hamaguchi is that shūdan shugi assumes that the individual and the 
collective are pitted against each other and marks the prioritization of the group over the 
individual. Returning to the discourse of corporate social structure, Hamaguchi advocates a 
notion of “corporativism” or kyōdō dantai shugi “共同団体主義” which, for Hamaguchi, is 
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uniquely Japanese.132 Instead of conceptualizing the individual and the collective as antithetical, 
Hamaguchi notes that the Japanese individual ties their selfhood in unity, or ittaika “一体化,” to 
the group such that the goals of the group are the goals of the individual member.133 This aspect 
of working in unity, as opposed to subordinating oneself to the demands of the group, is radical 
in that it challenges the predominately Western-influenced writers of Nihonjinron, who have 
traditionally conceptualized the individual in manner marred by Western ideology. Though there 
are aspects of both Hamaguchi and various other writers’ representations of Japanese social 
structure which overlap, Hamaguchi’s argument attempts to shift the discourse away from 
Western conceptualizations and seeks to present an image of societal structure that is “uniquely” 
Japanese.  
Part 3: The Language of Nihonjinron 
 Language plays a central role in ethnic identity, for it is the means through which one 
gains access to the worldview and thought processes of those who speak it.134 This old 
argumentation is one which, Befu notes, has been invoked commonly in anthropology and other 
disciplines.135 The Nihonjinron writers, linguists and non-linguists alike, argue similarly with 
regards to the Japanese language. Though some of the claims regarding the Japanese language fit 
within a larger discourse concerning all languages, Befu notes how Nihonjinron writers consider 
Japanese uniqueness something which can only be expressed in Japanese as another affirmation 
of their claims.136 Language is “at the core of Nihonjinron,” Befu argues, for the uniqueness of 
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Japanese culture and character, and thus ultimately identity, can only be properly expressed in 
the Japanese language.137 For linguist and non-linguist writers, the Japanese language is only 
natively spoken in Japan and all Japanese people in Japan can speak Japanese natively. 138 This 
forms the foundation of an identity rooted in language. 
Kindaichi Haruhiko argues that “Japanese is an isolated language” and is not related to 
any other language group, noting how dissimilar it is from “Ainu, Korean, Tibeto-Burmese, 
Ural-Altaic, and Malayo-Polynesian.”139 For Kindaichi, the lack of affiliation and proper 
linguistic consensus only further affirms how Japanese is a unique language in its own right.140 
Befu adds that since there is a supposedly “perfect isomorphism” between Japanese language 
speakers and bearers of Japanese culture, then the uniqueness of the language is also reflected 
and shaped by the uniqueness of the culture and people. 141  
 Given that the “one-to-one correspondence” of Japanese is not replicated in other 
linguistic contexts, then one should not think it possible to derive unique characteristics about the 
people or culture from other languages.142 To expand on this linguistic determinism of Japan’s 
cultural uniqueness, Tsunoda Tadanobu, a medical doctor, found differences in the way the 
hemispheres of the brain related to speech functioned in native Japanese speakers and native 
Western language speakers.143 What Tsunoda derived from the study he conducted is that the 
section of the brain dealing with “logos” and “pathos” were integrated in the Japanese thought 
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process while they were contrasted or opposite in the European thought process.144 Though this 
study has not been accepted by the wider medical community, since it used a rather small sample 
size and its methodology and execution have been called into question.145 However, despite its 
flaws, Tsunoda’s research gained publicity as it marked a form of scientific verification of 
Nihonjinron views related to the Japanese language’s uniqueness. 
 The linguistic Nihonjinron writers focus on deriving characteristics from the Japanese 
language that are then connected to Japanese culture and the Japanese people themselves. As 
mentioned above, the very thought processes of the Japanese mind are considered unique given 
the way the mind is structured. Less controversial aspects of this discourse entail how language 
reflects social structure, for Kindaichi notes how a variety of terms related to Japanese kinship 
groups connote unique social meanings.146 Citing the way in which terms such as older brother 
or onii-san “お兄さん” and older sister or onee-san “お姉さん” as well as younger brother or 
otōto “弟” and younger sister or imōto “妹” denote social status.147 While it is common to use a 
person’s proper name in English, even among siblings, for the Japanese, older siblings will refer 
to younger siblings by first name as a means of denoting their superior status while younger 
siblings will default to using the term onii-san, onee-san, or one of their variants in deference.148 
For Kindaichi, language and culture mirror each other and what we see in the former is reflected 
in the latter and vice versa.  
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 While there are other aspects of the discourse to consider, such as locality and its function 
in Japanese language, the logical structure of the language, and the communication patterns of 
nonverbal communication, I have given language a brief overlook in order to set up a larger 
discussion on culture. Though I have analyzed particular aspects of the Nihonjinron discourse, 
which all inherently relate to culture, an analysis of Japanese culture itself reveals just how 
intimately Japanese identity is tied to culture. While cultural variance from prefecture to 
prefecture exists, the prevailing ideology of “Japaneseness” constitutes the core of Japan’s 
cultural hegemony under which variance is subsumed. As noted with the linguistic discourse, 
controversy does not inhibit writers from asserting various, even conflicting, claims with others 
who are engaged in the same topic. It seems that so long as a writer is working within the 
parameters of nebulously defined framework of consensus, then their work is to some extent 
affirmed by the larger discursive enterprise as valid or worth considering. 
Part 4: Culture as Identity 
 Morris-Suzuki notes that the “very idea of ‘culture’ itself” is quite modern, being an 
intellectual ferment of European enlightenment, and only making its way into Japanese in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.149 While this does not mean that culture was not discussed 
or relevant to pre-Meiji Japanese intellectuals, the sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt notes that there 
was no “obvious sense of a sharp diving line between ‘nature’ and ‘culture.’”150 In regards to the 
discussion of Japanese culture or Nihon bunka “日本文化,” how are we to analyze Japanese 
conceptions of culture that pre-date the introduction of Western discourses and ideology? To 
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trace the discourse that developed in pre-Meiji era Japan requires an understanding of the 
influence China exerted as a center of culture and religion on its neighbors Korea and Japan. 
These two regions, different political entities in various regards from the modern nation-states, 
were connected to each other in regards to migration movements and cultural/ideological 
diffusion.  
 This particular relationship, between Korea and Japan, however, is not emphasized as 
much in the larger Nihonjinron discourse. Befu notes how Japanese archeologists were not 
emphasizing the similarities between the Yayoi and Tomb periods (2300 B.C.E. to 1400 B.C.E.), 
despite both Korean and Japanese cultures expressing many of the same cultural elements of the 
time.151 However, for Korean prehistorians and cultural historians, the commonalities between 
Korean culture and Japanese culture has advanced a view of marking Japan as “a mere 
appendage to Korea.”152 Though this particular outlook is expressive of Korean nationalism and 
is unlikely to have much sway with Nihonjinron writers. 
That Chinese culture, religion, and language affected Japan, however, is less 
controversial given that China was the regional hegemon before Western nations encroached into 
the “Far East.”153 The early Japanese socio-political structure was influenced by Chinese 
concepts such as bunka and bunmei “文明,” which are dichotomous terms denoting “culture” 
and “civilization” respectively.154 Politics and society were structured around bun “文” and bu 
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“武,” or the scholarly arts and martial arts. And though the intricacies of Japanese socio-political 
structuring and ideology are important for understanding key aspects of this research, an even 
more elaborate analysis of Japanese political history is outside the scope of this paper. What is of 
particular interest is how the phrase, and ideology, of bunmei evolved into the phrase bunmei 
kaika “文明開化” or “civilization and enlightenment” during the Meiji period.155 This phrase, 
Morris-Suzuki notes, was coined by Japan’s “Westernizers” to describe the series of social 
reforms and policies that were being enacted in order to transform Japanese society.156  
During the Meiji Restoration (1869 to 1912), Western ideology and discourses were 
being imported into the country by the nation’s scholars, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi who 
introduced a Westernized notion of bunmei into use.157 The European discourse on culture and 
civilization introduced into Meiji-era Japan is worth considering, for scholars were divided over 
the definition and connotations of the terms “culture” and “civilization.” Morris-Suzuki provides 
a brief glimpse into the discourse by looking at how the scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt saw 
culture as “the control of nature by science and technology” and civilization as “the improvement 
of human customs and manners.”158 Other scholars of the time, however, argued that culture is 
the “intangible world of social values and ideals” and that civilization is “the tangible 
achievements of human science and technology.”159 The distinction being raised by European 
scholars did not only concern “nonmaterial values and material systems,” but also involved the 
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“spatial and temporal visions of difference.”160 According to Morris-Suzuki, this discourse 
outlined the distinction as: 
Culture, in other words, was the realm of spatial difference—a world divided by the 
differing social mores of distinct communities—while civilization was the realm of 
time—a universal trajectory toward which different societies moved at different 
speeds.161 
It was this particular discourse and ideology that shaped the meaning of the phrase bunmei kaika 
and which influenced Fukuzawa’s writings on bunmei.162 
 While one might question why I have not examined the particulars of what we 
“traditionally” associate with culture, such as ritual beliefs, sports, literature, or the like, it is 
because taking these manifestations of cultural expression as representative of Japanese culture 
begets the question of “what makes it Japanese?” From the center of cultural hegemony, the 
periphery becomes the alienated, it becomes “Othered.” In the case of Meiji Japan, the centers of 
modernization became the preferred image of Japan while the outer-lying regions of Japan 
became cites of backwardness.163 The rise of nationalism would eventually propel the discourse 
on culture forward and could be seen in the works of the philosopher Nishida Kitarō, whose 
work detailed the relationship of environment and subject.164 For Nishida, Japanese 
consciousness emerged from the relationship of the Japanese people and the territory that they 
occupied.165 At the core of this Japanese consciousness was the abstract figure of the emperor, 
who transcended the “contradictions of selfhood” and who represented the “now” which entailed 
both past and future.166And though Nishida was against transforming Japan into an “an 
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unreflective ‘subject’ of a drama of imperialism,” he emphasized the “destiny of Japanese culture 
in a new world order.”167 This echoes the prevailing socio-political ideology that took root 
during the increased militarization and imperialism of Japan during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 While there are many facets of the Nihonjinron discourse concerning culture, one should 
note how the meta-narrative of cultural supremacy and cultural identity were begin formulated in 
various social institutions. While the Japanese intelligentsia and military of the Meiji-era, Taishō 
(1912 to 1926), and early Shōwa (1926 to 1989) focused on reforming Japanese society at all 
levels in order to assert Japan in the international arena, they also became involved with the 
production of national identity.168 Returning to Hobsbawm’s concept of “invented tradition,” the 
creation of tradition was part of Japanese institutions and intellectuals’ attempts to define not 
only themselves in relation to the Western powers, but also to define for Japanese people what it 
meant to be “Japanese”.169 The ethnographer Yanagita Kunio redefined how “culture” was 
understood in a Japanese discourse that had long been influenced and shaped by Western 
ideology and Orientalism.170 For Yanagita, culture was “the existing state of harmony of many 
elements both old and new” and Japanese culture, in particular, is “dynamic and adaptive.”171 
 Yanagita, however, also fused nationalism with culture studies, for he saw the attachment 
certain regions of Japan had with “local culture” as inhibiting the development of Japan into a 
proper nation.172 Indeed, the production of culture and national tradition, embodying a 
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hegemonic sense of “Japaneseness” was even a necessary activity, which Morris-Suzuki sums up 
as: 
“Culture,” in short, must be something national, because defining it in any other way 
would erode social harmony; so the definition slips quietly from being a description of 
actual social belief s and practices in all their dynamic complexity, to being a description 
of the beliefs and practices which must be created: a utopian goal symbolized, for 
Yanagita, by the traditional festival (matsuri) in which all social division dissolves in the 
ecstasy of communal celebration.173 
The focus on embodying a central essence of “Japaneseness” is important for scholars like 
Yanagita, who believed that Japan could only “progress” with a clear image of what Japan ought 
to be like. That the whole of Nihonjinron discourse is both national studies and a reaction to 
Western imperialism and Orientalism is made more evident by a continued insistence by 
Nihonjinron writers to define the parameters of a Japanese uniqueness true of all Japanese people 
and culture. The creation of a national identity, then must supersede local identity and must 
subsume or subjugate any variance that deviates from the established norm. However, the 
concern over forming a national identity is in relation to the “imagined community” to whom 
that identity would have meaning. Thus, to understand yet another dimension of Nihonjinron 
discourse, and therefore how Japanese identity is constructed, one should analyze how writers 
and institutions transpose cultural uniqueness onto the people themselves. 
Part 5: The Idea of Yamato Minzoku “大和民族”  
 If the grouping of culture and race strikes any reader as odd, then it would be because the 
old method for conceptualizing one’s racial and cultural identity were not as distinguished in the 
past as they are in contemporary times. While one might argue that one’s race or ethnicity does 
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not determine their cultural participation, understanding, or identity, Japanese discourses 
concerning nationalism, Nihonjinron, and identity often conflate the two or regard them as 
inextricably linked. Race and racism, as contemporary Western readers and scholars understand 
them, are incredibly complicated and intricate mechanisms and ideologies of social stratification 
founded upon phenotypic differences/markers and the superior-inferior group characteristics, 
values, and stereotypes derived and imposed upon bodies from said differences. While this is a 
simplified definition of racism and race, we require some model for proceeding with this 
analysis. The racial discourse of the West, its role in social formation and pervasive influence 
over all aspects of Western ideology, ground it, not exclusively in a Western context, but within 
the historical processes of the West. And while we are able to trace the advancement and 
diffusion of these mechanisms and ideologies to other regions of the world subjected to Western 
colonialism and imperialism, we cannot transpose the Western discourse of race, with all its 
intricacies and peculiarities, onto non-Western countries. If we are to understand how racial 
discourse evolved in Japan it is crucial to know what the discourse was prior to the importation 
of Western ideology and then to understand how the changing Western discourse influenced the 
Japanese discourse. 
 The scholar Timon Screech argues that “Japan has always considered itself ethnically 
pure, and in this it draws a distinction with China and Korea, held to be racially diverse.”174 
Though this appears to return to the discourse on homogeneity detailed earlier in the paper, it is 
important to note that the social stratification of Japanese society prior to the Meiji Restoration 
emphasized locality in relation to the “center” represented by the emperor and the Shogunate 
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(government ruled by Shogun). Morris-Suzuki conceptualizes this as “an inherently unequal 
social order where everyone theoretically occupied a place in an intricate galaxy of status 
spiraling outward from a center.”175 This social stratification is reflected in the dynamics of 
center-periphery ideology, the more peripheral one is, the more marginal and “Othered” one 
becomes. Pre-Meiji Japan heavily emphasized the virtue and order of the center in relation to 
which the marginal members of society, such as social outcastes and foreigners, and outer 
peoples, like the Ainu of northeastern Japan and Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyūans of the Ryūkyū 
Islands, were seen as subversive and un-Japanese.176  
 The socio-political orientation of pre-Meiji Japanese society did not incorporate the 
concept of distinct political rights and did not exclude people from having those rights on the 
basis of race.177 Morris-Suzuki instead prompts us to understand the concept of political ordering 
as “an infinite set of social gradation defined in terms of ideas of social function, order, 
propriety, and political submission.” 178 And though there is a particular social group, the 
hisabetsu burakumin, who challenge this assertion of there being no racial discrimination in Pre-
Meiji Japan, this topic will be addressed later in the paper. Given that the structure of social 
stratification in Pre-Meiji Japan did not rely on concepts of race or present us with a definite, 
albeit Western, example of racism, Japanese racial discourse was either incorporated into an 
even more encompassing social ideology or only became prevalent during the Meiji Restoration. 
 The Meiji government sought to pursue policies of “Westernization” in order to assert 
Japan’s self-determination as a nation and prevent its own colonization by Western powers 
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during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The old feudal institutions and policies of the 
preceding Tokugawa government, with its sumptuary laws, internal immigration policies, and 
ban on Christianity, were abolished.179 The Edict Abolishing Ignoble Classes or Senmin 
Haishirei “賤民廃止令, also known as the Emancipation Edict or Kaihōrei “解放令,” was 
passed in 1871 and granted equal status as “Japanese” to all social groups and outcastes. Morris-
Suzuki, however, argues that this entailed being a member of “a clearly bounded nation-state to 
which all owed an equal duty of loyalty” and in which the “equality of allegiance” did not confer 
to “equality of rights.”180 The socio-political structure of Meiji Japan, while democratizing to an 
extent, never intended to adopt any full egalitarian social ideology, for Japan’s leaders gravitated 
toward a view of the nation as a family, expressed as ie or kazoku “家族.”181 This model allowed 
the government and leaders to justify the new societal changes, since like a family, all people 
were members of a single community, but, just like a family, the members have different rights 
and duties.182 Extending this model to the nation-state itself asserted the emperor as the apex of 
Japanese society and redefined them as the “father of the nation” or the head of the “family-
state” or kazoku kokka “家族国家.”183 
 In regards to the discourse on race, the Meiji intelligentsia began adapting the imported 
Western ideologies concerning race or jinshu “人種” and then later those concerning the 
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concepts of volk, ethnic groups, or minzoku “民族.”184 Westernizers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi 
popularized these Western racial ideas in Japan, employing not he terms of jinshu and bunmei 
together.185 The discourse on culture and civilization was likewise marked by what Morris-
Suzuki calls “two axes for the definition of difference” of which the first entailed “geographical 
space.”186 The ideology of national solidarity and national superiority allowed “ideologues” to 
perpetuate concepts which linked people either by “blood bonds of common origin,” race, or 
“common language or traditions,” ethnicity.187  
The second axis was “time,” embodied in the discourse of “progress” in which all of 
humanity was proceeding upon a single, universal trajectory.188 The ideology of social 
Darwinism would further complicate these two interwoven axes by promoting the concept that 
different races were representative of different stages in the march toward “civilization.”189 This 
particularly shifted the perspective of Japanese people toward peripheral groups within Japan’s 
boundaries, like the Ainu, who were no longer perceived as “foreign” but instead as 
“backward.”190 Furthermore, the rise of Japanese imperialism in the surrounding regions of 
Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria required ideological justification in order to legitimize Japan’s 
expansion.191 Though the discourse incorporated a number of arguments, three main forms of 
ideology emerged: the first emphasizing the racial superiority of the Japanese in relation to the 
conquered subjects; the second stressing the racial or cultural commonalities of the colonized 
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and the colonizers; the third asserting Japanese society as embodying a more advanced form of 
modern civilization.192 Though the term used in this discourse is “race,” it refers to minzoku, 
which was nebulous enough to be used in all three different contexts as race, ethnicity, or nation. 
The first racial ideology advocated a conceptualization of Japan and the Japanese people 
as racially pure and homogenous. Nationalist Nihonjinron writers like Hozumi Yatsuka argued 
that the national body/entity or kokutai “国体” is linked by blood to the imperial family, who 
themselves are descendants of the ancient divine spirits or kami “神” of Japanese Shintō “神
道.”193 And this particular line of argumentation not only created a sense of national identity 
oriented around the imperial family, but assert the Japanese people’s superiority to other peoples 
and nations. This ideology of purity and superiority also gave Japan a sense of a “divine 
mission” to liberate other parts of Asia from Western imperialism and colonialism.194 However 
well the proponents, who were co-opting pre-existing notions of Japanese cultural beliefs, 
advocated this view, it did not work to reconcile Japan with its colonial subjects.195 
An alternate racial view of Japan, advocated by historian Sadakichi Kita and others, was 
that Japan was originally inhabited by a variety of different racial groups who were assimilated 
by a single ethnic group.196 Though the subjugating group was, as Morris-Suzuki puts it, 
“somewhat ill-defined,” Japanese scholars considered them the ancient relatives of the Koreans. 
By assimilating the distinct racial groups living in Japan, and likewise later absorbing migrants 
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from Korea and China, this group lead to the emergence of the Yamato minzoku, an archaic term 
Kita used for referring to the inhabitants of Japan.197 While this theory rejects the notion of racial 
purity, Kita still emphasized the role of the emperor as the descendant of the people who unified 
Japan into a single cultural and political entity.198 Thus, the emperor was the metaphorical head 
of the national family, not the literal blood relative like the racial purity advocates argued.199 
Likewise, the uniqueness of the Japanese did not lie in their racial purity, but instead in their 
ability to mold disparate elements into a unified whole, which fit the Social Darwinian concept 
of group/culture struggle.200  
This particular theory of racial amalgamation allowed Japan to not only preserve its own 
sense of cultural superiority, with the emperor as representative of the nation-state, but promoted 
an idea that all colonial subjects could successfully integrate into Japanese society. Others were 
conceptualized as “incomplete Japanese” who simply needed to be assimilated into the larger 
Japanese socio-political apparatus.201 Colonial subjects abroad and at home were subjected to 
policies of assimilation and were tasked with adopting the Japanese language and Japanese 
culture.202 This ideology also supported the notion that Japan had a mission to rescue other Asian 
nations not only from Western powers, but their own cultural backwardness. The later military 
government of early Shōwa Japan would embody this in their imperialistic policy of hakkō ichiu 
“八紘一宇” or “the eight directions of the world under one roof.”203 With the Yamato minzoku at 
the head of these other Asian countries and Japanese culture as the center, continuously 
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absorbing, consuming, and transforming difference, Japan would establish a homogenous 
cultural hegemony.204 
However, race itself did not need to play a central role in the imperialistic ideology of 
Japan nor in its colonial rule, for the third strain of this discourse focused on Japan’s advanced 
civilization and culture alone.205 Scholars of the post-World War II era have noted how even 
though the racial and cultural perspectives were often times conflated and interwoven, it is clear 
that racial exclusion and subordination need not rely on concepts of “racial” superiority alone.206 
Placing social groups on a continuum from cultural backwardness to cultural progressiveness 
propelled the Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa era Japanese intelligentsia and leaders to justify social 
stratification, colonialism, and militarization.207 Culture, race, and nation are heavily interwoven 
and often used interchangeably when discussing groups of people, which is why the 
nebulousness of the term minzoku works well within the Nihonjinron discourse. As we have 
analyzed, there have been many writers and works within, and outside of, Japanese society and 
throughout Japanese history that sought to define Japanese identity in terms of ecology, social 
structure, language, culture, and race/ethnicity. 
The Shadow Japanese Identity Casts 
Nihonjinron writers and scholars like Befu, Morris-Suzuki, Dale, and others have 
provided us not only with the content, but analyses of and methodologies for studying what 
has/is being said about the Japanese cultural production of identity. And though it is important to 
provide a meta-analysis of what I have done, it is important to reiterate that my aim is not to 
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endorse the discourse nor its elements. While it is possible that some features of Nihonjinron 
might be more valid than others, one should focus on the complexity and interwoven nature of 
these various cultural components of identity. To derive some essence of “Japaneseness” would 
be to engage in the sort of essentialist, Orientalism that Said warns is indicative of Western 
imperialism and renders my focus on elaborating the parameters of Japanese identity mute. Then, 
one might ask again, what does it “mean” to be Japanese? Or for something to be Japanese? The 
answer does not lie in a definition nor in a universally, identifiable essence, but in an 
understanding of how Japanese identity is formed by interwoven cultural and historical processes 
and discourse. 
The image of Japan as homogenous nation is one that is fabricated, but reified in the 
interconnectedness of numerous cultural elements and institutions which construct and 
perpetuate the notion of Japanese homogeneity. As argued by Hobsbawm, Yanagita, and others, 
nations and peoples engage in the process of constructing their own national identity and sense 
of historical continuity. The methodology employed here to analyze the Nihonjinron discourse 
could very well be applied to other national studies. However, this understanding of Japanese 
identity, its components and relation to cultural institutions and discourse, allows us to compare 
how minority identity is created. The two groups that I will be focusing on for the remainder of 
this paper will be the Zainichi Koreans and the hisabetsu burakumin. Upon analyzing these two 
groups’ particular histories and identities, I will re-address Japan’s status as either a 
homogenous, multicultural, or multiethnic nation.  
While it is possible to approach the topic of identity from a variety of methodologies, I 
want to emphasize the relational dimension of mainstream identity to marginalized identity. 
Incorporated within this particular discourse are strains of minority self-determination and 
Lopez-Duran 47 
 
identity construction, though these elements will be contextualized within the larger apparatus of 
Japanese society. Having presented these considerations, I will attempt to replicate a similar 
analysis for these minority groups as I did for Japanese identity, avoiding essentialism and 
acknowledging the potential biases of my approach. 
Colonization, War, and Resistance: Koreans and Zainichi Koreans in the Japanese 
Cultural Landscape 
The Zainichi Koreans or Resident Koreans “在日韓国人” are by various measures, one 
of Japan’s oldest minority groups. While the term “Zainichi Korean” is useful for describing the 
ethnic Korean population of Japan, it can denote either a Japanese citizen or permanent resident, 
who arrived in Japan prior to 1945 or who is a descendant of said Korean population. Yet, the 
relationship between Korea and Japan, as indicated by the previous exploration of Nihonjinron, 
is far from benign or harmonious. Japan has long attempted to exert political, economic, and 
cultural control over its neighbor.208 Korea’s status as an independent region, let alone as a self-
determined nation, has long been conceptually contested by pre-World War II Japanese leaders 
and scholars.209 Yet, how has Korea-Japan relations changed over time? What prompted the 
image shift of Korea in the Japanese cultural landscape? What aspects of Japanese social 
structure and ideology help us understand how Korean identity is shaped by Japanese discourse? 
What does it mean to be Zainichi Korean in contemporary Japan? These are some of the 
questions that will guide my analysis of this particular inquiry into Korea-Japan relations and 
Korean identity in relation to Japanese cultural hegemony. 
                                                          
208 Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, 28. 
209 Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, 48. 
Lopez-Duran 48 
 
 The scholar Jeffrey Bayliss explores the relationship between Korea and Japan from the 
rise of the Meiji government until after World War II in his work On the Margins of Empire: 
Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan. Bayliss is concerned with a similar 
analysis of the Korean and hisabetsu burakumin communities in Japan, their struggles for 
liberation, their experiences with discrimination, and the ideology and discourses creating and 
perpetuating mechanisms of oppressions.210 Furthermore, Bayliss is concerned with the 
proximity of these two groups and their commonalities and differences as Japanese minority 
groups.211 Given that the two groups often shared the same space and experienced nearly 
identical forms of discrimination, a narrative of solidarity would naturally develop.212 However, 
it is this precise assumption, which some scholars take, that Bayliss is concerned with critiquing. 
Noting how scholars of the minority groups often exclude the other group when recounting one 
of the group’s narrative, Bayliss asserts that scholars are failing to account for the influences 
these two marginalized people have had on each other.213 Scholars who speak about the 
hisabetsu burakumin or Koreans also conflate particular sub-sections of the groups as 
representative of the whole, ignoring that in challenging Japanese homogeneity, they construct 
homogenous representations of the minority groups.214 
 However, with these considerations in mind, Bayliss examines the intricacies of 
discrimination and the Japanese discourse that perpetuated ideologies that “Othered” these two 
groups. To elaborate on the particulars of Korean identity and its relation to the narratives and 
ideologies created, maintained, and perpetuated by Japan, we can begin with an analysis of the 
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Japanese cultural imagination of Korea. There are many aspects of Bayliss’s analysis and 
methodology that provide valuable insight and directions for understanding the role of Korea in 
Japan and the discourses that arose in both communities. While it is possible to perpetuate 
problematic representations of peoples and nations when deconstructing ideological tenets, it is 
important to recognize that facets of argumentations or discourse are not representative of some 
“absolute truth” regarding either the Koreans or the Japanese.  
Korean-Japanese History: Subordination through Discourse and Culture 
 While Bayliss only briefly mentions the mythological subjugation of the Three Korean 
Kingdoms by Japan’s Empress Jingū (169 C.E. to 269 C.E.) within the larger context of Japanese 
scholars associating the outcaste eta with Korea, he notes it follows a trend in Japanese 
discourse.215 Though I will analyze this larger discourse later, one should note how interwoven 
Korea is with “otherness” for the Japanese intelligentsia. The fact that within the Japanese 
cultural landscape there exists a connection, of subjugator to subjugated, between Japan and 
Korea is central to this analysis. The veracity of the account is not as important as the meaning 
that it has for Japanese people who consider it part of their cultural worldview. It is indicative of 
a mode of conceptualizing Korea as subordinate to Japan or which marks Korea as a former 
possession, and the Korean people former subjects, of Japan.216 
The history of Japan and Korea dates back millennia and incorporates a number of 
historical processes such as population movements from the latter to the former, cultural and 
religious diffusion from Korea to Japan, and Korea connecting Japan to the rest of Asia.217 
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However, proximity has also been a source of conflict and following the unification of the 
disparate Japanese feudal domains by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537 to 1598), Korea was involved 
in Hideyoshi’s attempted incursion into Ming China. The Joseon government, a Chinese ally, 
refused to allow Japanese troops to land on Korean soil and would not grant Hideyoshi’s army 
free-passage into China. This defiance prompted Hideyoshi to initiate an invasion of Korea 
(1592 to 1598). The invasions, however, ended in failure and the Toyotomi Clan lost much of its 
political power and influence following the costly venture and the death of Hideyoshi. 
Afterwards, Bayliss notes a shift in political relations between Japan and Korea during 
the Tokugawa period, as the Tokugawa government sought to normalize relations with the 
country.218 Given that Korea was a heavily Confucian state, the Neo-Confucian Tokugawa 
government and Japanese scholars held Korean culture and intellectual achievements in high 
regard.219 However, the ideological conception of Korea as subordinate to Japan also morphed, 
for the Tokugawa government was interested in getting Korea to send embassies to Japan. The 
government hoped to portray the diplomatic missions as paying homage to the Shogun, thereby 
promoting the legitimacy of the government and projecting Japan as superior to Korea.220 
Though the government took measures to mask any sense of Japanese arrogance, socio-political 
ideology began to change with the rise of the national learning or kokugaku “国学” school of 
thought.221 
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This intellectual movement sought to purge Japan of degenerative foreign influence, 
including Chinese and Korean Confucianism.222 Thus, we return to scholars like Yamaguchi 
Kōjū and Aoyagi Tanenobu, who attempted to connect Korea with the lowly pariah of Japanese 
society.223 The discourse concerning Korea would continue to change as the Tokugawa 
government lost power and the Meiji administration seized control of the nation. Following the 
pattern of social and political reform in Japan, the Meiji oligarchs redefined their position to 
Korea and promoted the ideology of “subjugating Korea” or Seikanron “征韓論.”224 In 1876, the 
Meiji government forced Korea to engage in trade and diplomacy via the Kanghwa Treaty and 
though Bayliss thinks it would be incorrect to see these events as indicative of a “fully developed 
imperialistic drive toward controlling Korea,” he does see it as a dramatic departure from the 
Tokugawa rulers’ policies towards Korea.225 
Likewise, the political policies of the Meiji government coincided with the intellectual 
changes in Japanese discourse concerning Korea. The older Tokugawa kokugaku scholars’ 
derision of Korea morphed into a full rejection of Korean traditional culture by Meiji-era 
scholars like Fukuzawa Yukichi.226 Fukuzawa’s emphasis on “civilization and enlightenment” or 
bunmei kaika facilitated his particularly negative assessment of Korea, which he characterized as 
a “small, barbaric country” that was far behind Japanese civilization.227 For scholars like 
Fukuzawa, who were focused on the Westernization of Japan, anything that did not contribute to 
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the national goal of obtaining power and asserting Japan’s self-determination to Western 
imperialist powers was deemed a “harmful distraction.”228 
With the continued rise of Japan’s imperial powers and absorption of Western ideology, 
Korea’s position within Japanese discourse was constantly changing. The introduction of social 
Darwinism in the 1870s fueled Japanese scholars in their attempts at defining and redefining 
both Japan’s relation to the West, itself as a nation, and Japan’s position to the rest of Asia.229 
The emphasis on group struggle and cultural struggle in social Darwinism was used by some 
scholars to promote notions of eugenics and race, such as Takahashi Yoshio’s On the 
Improvement of the Japanese Race, which outlined the inherent degeneracy and unhygienic 
nature of the hisabetsu burakumin.230 Scholars became more adamant about locating the 
hisabetsu burakumin as peripheral and foreign, equating them and Koreans as members of the 
same “racial stock.”231 For Japanese social Darwinists, the “backwardness” of the hisabetsu 
burakumin was indicative of the Korean’s inability to self-rule and the cultural gap between 
Korea and Japan was indicative of the difference inherent in hisabetsu burakumin and their 
inability to self-improve.232 The semi-egalitarian and humanistic rhetoric of the early Meiji 
period, which saw the abolishment of the hisabetsu burakumin’s outcaste status, became less 
prevalent as the negative qualities of the groups were blamed on the very victims of 
discrimination themselves.233 
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The anthropologist Fujii Kansuke, writing in 1886, published a critical article about the 
eta and their connection to the Koreans.234 While the connection being made was oriented 
around both groups’ consumption of meat, Fujii once again emphasized the legend of Korean 
slaves and war prisoners as being the ancestors of the eta.235 This continued framing of Korea as 
a traditionally subordinate entity to Japan perpetuated the idea of inherent Korean inferiority and 
inability to self-rule. As discussed earlier in the paper, Japanese scholars contrasted Japan’s own 
racial and cultural identity with Korea’s.236 Anthropologists Oguma Eiji and Torii Ryūzō, like 
Sadakichi Kita, advocated the notion that the Japanese were a composite of different races.237 
Yet, how was the discourse concerning the Japanese as an amalgamation of “non-Japanese 
groups” related to the discourse disparaging hisabetsu burakumin for their supposed foreignness? 
Any inconsistency was resolved by emphasizing the uniqueness of the Japanese people’s ability 
to blend and assimilate disparate racial groups, unlike the hisabetsu burakumin who retained 
their intrinsic foreignness.238 
Bayliss argues that the concept of the “emperor-centered, homogenous Japanese nation-
state: the kokutai” further ostracized peripheral groups like the hisabetsu burakumin.239 This 
social structure, Bayliss continues, is not a “vertical hierarchy,” but a “concentric map of racial 
purity” radiating from the emperor to the outermost fringes, inhabited by marginalized groups 
like the hisabetsu burakumin.240 While Koreans were subjected to similar modes of social 
stratification and discrimination, the full-brunt of Japanese cultural hegemony would only be felt 
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later when Japan made Korea a national concern.241 Prior to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894 
to 1895), Japanese scholars were frustrated by the seeming inability of the Korean court and 
people to initiate their own “Meiji-style self-improvement program.”242 And following the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904 to 1905), Japanese scholars began to propose the view of Korean 
society as emblematic of “stagnation theory” or teitairon “停滞論.”243 Founded upon the social 
Darwinist conception of social groups representing different stages of a continuum from 
barbarity to civilization, Japanese scholars claimed that Korea was stalled at a point in 
development that Japan had long surpassed.244 However, following the annexation of Korea in 
1905, a new conceptualization of Korea-Japan relations entered the discursive landscape as 
proponents of Korean-Japanese affinity and kinship promoted the theory of common ancestry 
between Japanese and Koreans or nissen dōsoron “日鮮同祖論.”245 
Although the proponents of dōsoron were more accommodating of Korea within Japan’s 
cultural landscape, emphasizing things such as racial kinship and cultural contributions and 
service, they recognized the superior cultural and moral qualities of the race that militarily 
subjugated the Japanese Isles.246 Though scholars located the origins of the “heaven-descended” 
race, or amakudari “天下り,” outside of Japan, they did not locate the origins in the Korean 
Peninsula in a way that elevated Koreans.247 Rather, the imperial connection to Korea is 
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reaffirmed in the supposed mythological conquest of the Korean Peninsula following the creation 
of a unified, political entity in Japan.248 Yet, while Japan’s cultural superiority and uniqueness 
were still affirmed by dōsoron scholars, Korean’s racial and cultural inferiority were explained 
away by 1) Korean “racial stock” containing greater “inferior” elements, 2) Korea’s geographic 
separation from Japan’s nourishing cultural production, or 3) Korea’s proximity to China and its 
subversive culture.249 The only way for Korean’s to actualize their full potential was for them to 
assimilate themselves into Japanese culture, a move advocated by many dōsoron scholars like 
Kita, who considered Korea to be like a “weak branch family [buke]” of Japan, the “affluent and 
stable main family [honke].”250 For Kita, not only is the main family obligated to help the branch 
family, but the branch family would welcome their chance to assimilate themselves into the main 
family.251 Japan would utilize its unique ability to assimilate other racial groups on the Koreans, 
and since the Koreans were not a totally different racial group, they would be able to blend into 
Japanese society easily. Bayliss notes that in the dōsoron discourse “race” equaled “culture.”252 
While teitairon and dōsoron appear as opposing socio-historical interpretations of Korea, 
their main difference lies in regards to the Korean people’s ability to “smoothly and seamlessly” 
integrate into the Japanese Empire.253 While the dōsoron scholars did not think it would be 
challenging, teitairon scholars argued that Koreans could only be elevated to the level of 
Japanese civilization with the proper guidance, though some were pessimistic about the time 
required for Koreans to do so.254 With Korea’s full annexation by the Japanese Empire in 1910, 
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Japanese programs aimed at assimilating Koreans were enacted, though there had been no 
discursive consensus on the most efficient and effective methods of assimilation.255 In fact, 
earlier discourses relating the Koreans and burakumin contradict the dōsoron view, for if the 
burakumin were descendants of Koreans, then their inability to integrate fully into Japanese 
society, despite their history in Japan and proximity to its cultural influence, would mean 
Koreans would fail to integrate as well.256 Though there were many discrepancies in the various 
schools of thought, each implicated the Koreans as foreign or alien to the proper Japanese way of 
life. 
The build-up to the full annexation of Korea was marked by not only resistance 
movements in Korea, but by increasing anti-Korean sentiments in Japan. The assassination of the 
statesman Itō Hirobumi by the Korean nationalist An Chunggŭn in particular sparked a wave of 
attacks against Korean migrants in Japan and increased Japanese public distrust of Koreans.257 
The characterizations of Koreans as conniving, self-serving, and treacherous were perpetuated by 
Japanese media further fueling negative stereotypes of the country and people.258 In addition to 
the previous traits of backward, degenerate, and criminal, Koreans were being imposed with all 
sorts of negative value judgments on their bodies, not simply their attitudes or actions.259 Though 
there was push toward shifting public perception of Koreans to a more positive light following 
the annexation of Korea, the new characterizations were simply more patronizing and 
condescending in nature.260 
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International concerns expressed in Japan’s policy of improving its own national standing 
required that particular attention be given to the issue of minorities. The national discourse was 
still concerned with assimilating or subsuming any form of deviance or difference. Eventually 
the processes of socialization made minority groups internalize the discriminatory ideology they 
experienced and inspired some to adhere to national directives.261 However, other groups sought 
to rectify the gross injustices they were subjected to and demanded that the government adhere to 
its own ideology of equal status among subjects.262 Though these demands often met with little 
success, the hisabetsu burakumin were eventually able to assert themselves in certain regards.263 
However, the continued reliance on the officially-sanctioned narratives derived from Japanese 
discourse, which deemed Koreans and hisabetsu burakumin as inherently un-Japanese, rendered 
the groups helpless against an unsympathetic public and government.264 Furthermore, without a 
solid sense of self-identity, both Koreans and hisabetsu burakumin were vulnerable to complying 
with social stereotypes and characterizations of their persons.265 Contradictory characterizations 
of minority groups did not raise questions about inconsistency or ideological failures and no 
matter how much minorities tried to assimilate into Japanese society, minorities were seen as 
constantly affirming their own difference.266 
Given the continued resistance of Japanese colonization, Koreans were subjected to acts 
of violence both in Korea and in Japan. Following the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, anti-
Korean sentiments sparked a series of attacks against Korean laborers and migrants, resulting in 
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the persecution and deaths of more than 2000 Koreans.267 However, Koreans would remain 
subject to the mechanisms of Japanese social ideology and discrimination from 1910 until 1945, 
though there were many groups and movements resisting its hegemony. It is quite telling that the 
ideological shifts of Japanese discourse which promoted equality between the Koreans and the 
Japanese or among Japanese subjects often failed to reflect social reality.268 Korea has a long 
history of being conceived of as the opposite of Japan, as a source of “Otherness,” and as a 
subversive subordinate. Though there were discourses concerning the genuine integration of 
Koreans into Japanese society, these outlooks not only assumed the superiority of Japanese 
culture, but also ostracized Koreans in the very process of assimilating them. 
The Remnants of Colonialism: Zainchi Koreans in Contemporary Japan 
The discriminatory ideology developed during the Meiji era continued to fuel Japanese 
perceptions of Korea and other foreign groups until the end of World War II and beyond. 
Though there are changes to how Koreans are perceived given the rise of the two Korean 
nations, modern Korea-Japan relations are marred by the historical oppression of the former by 
the latter. While modern forms of discrimination have their roots in the ideologies of pre-war and 
wartime Japan, modern Korean-Japanese relations involve land disputes, Japanese government 
officials visiting Yasukuni Shrine, which memorizes the war dead including war criminals, the 
“comfort women” or sexual slavery of Korean and other women by the Japanese military during 
World War II, and the subversive activity of North Korea. While the ascension of North Korea 
                                                          
267 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1998), 105. 
268 Jeffrey P. Bayliss, On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan, (London: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2013), 56. 
Lopez-Duran 59 
 
and South Korea requires us to distinguish new nuances to Korea-Japan relations, our focus is on 
the Zainichi Koreans living in Japan. 
The Korean movements for social equality had their roots in the nationalistically-oriented 
Korean student movements of the Meiji era, who were reacting to discrimination in Japan and its 
colonial practices in Korea.269 While this particularly vocal group of Koreans are often seen as 
representative of the entire Korean community in Japan, Bayliss cautions that there were great 
differences among various Korean organizations in terms of their politics and aims.270 
Furthermore, there is more variance than the term “Korean movement” or “Korean community” 
allow, for the Korean population in Japan is not a monolithic entity.271 While minority groups’ 
political activities were heavily suppressed during the war, Koreans, and other groups, were able 
to re-mobilize following the end of the war. The two prominent Zainichi Korean organizations in 
Japan are the South Korean-backed Mindan and the North Korean-backed Chōsen Sōren, which 
have carried out their own respective campaigns and programs for improving the welfare of the 
Japanese Zainichi communities.272 
And what is the relation between contemporary Zainichi Korean communities and 
Japanese hegemony? While a deeper analysis of the group itself might reveal numerous 
intricacies and narrative variances, a cursory analysis of contemporary anti-Korean 
discrimination reveals that their access to equal employment, education, and marriage, among 
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other things, is still challenged by prevailing cultural norms of “otherness.”273 The very term 
itself “Zainichi” denotes a dimension of temporality that does not reflect the established 
historical connection of the Korean group in Japan. Though they have permanent residency 
status, Zainichi Koreans are regarded as visiting foreigners. The former colonial subjects, who 
had gained some political rights, lost them following the end of World War II, for they were no 
longer considered Japanese citizens.274 For those living in Japan, the Nationality Act of 1950, 
later revised in 1952 and 1984, continued to insist on the principle of ius sanguinis, or bloodline, 
as the basis of citizenship.275 Furthermore, subtle cultural coercion to adopt a “Japanese-
sounding name” as part of the naturalization process continues to perpetuate a sense of Japanese 
cultural hegemony.276 Yet, Zainichi Koreans are prompted by both the Mindan and Chōsen 
Sōren organizations to retain their distinct Korean identities.277 However, the loss of certain 
assimilationist elements in the naturalization process have facilitated more people to adopt 
Japanese citizenship.278 
Morris-Suzuki advocates an understanding of identity that is not fixed, for younger 
generations of Zainichi Koreans can speak Japanese, they have no “racially” identifiable 
differences, and participate in the same cultural rituals as their Japanese peers.279 The symbolic 
identification with their Korean ethnicity comes in the form of retaining their “Korean” names, 
though this becomes not solely a matter of self-identification since it is also reinforced by social 
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ideology.280 The issue concerning identity is not one about minorities becoming the same as the 
majority nor allowing the minority to retain their difference, but questioning how boundaries are 
“maintained, shifted, and reinterpreted in the process of struggles over the nature of the state.”281 
Grounding one’s identity in an essentialist conceptualization of ethnic minority is, according to 
the writer Chong Yong Hye, a means of validating the “existing stereotypes about the 
homogeneity and purity of the majority.”282  To identify oneself as “purely Korean” is to allow 
others to identify as “purely Japanese,” therefore, Chong proposes that one identifies oneself as 
“impurely ‘Japanese’” or fujun Nihonjin “不純日本人” and thereby implicate oneself as 
“impurely ‘Korean.’”283  
In accordance with Morris-Suzuki’s concern about boundaries, Chong proposes that each 
individual learn to coexist not only with difference external to oneself, but also within oneself.284 
In the case of marginalized people who are made peripheral by ideology and social structures, 
appropriating one’s peripheral status is the first act of actualizing difference and challenging 
pervading social norms, ideology, and cultural hegemony.285 The majority of the discourse 
analyzed has been concerned with the way in which dominate social discourses define not only 
the mainstream populace’s identity but also how they define, subsume, or make invisible those 
peripheral to it. The early Meiji Korean student movements mobilized while depending on the 
narratives, justifying the subjugation of Korea and its treatment of the Korean people, offered by 
the state. Later social movements, however, engaged in the processes of community and identity 
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creation.286 To disrupt, challenge, and deconstruct cultural hegemony requires the existence of 
difference which is expressed through the creation of counter-cultural identity. 
While contemporary Zainichi Korean identity is shaped by the continued pervasiveness 
of Japanese cultural hegemony and political disputes, understanding the mechanisms of 
“othering” and oppression that occur within Japan presents an opportunity for Zainichi Koreans 
to redefine their own identity. As Chong and Morris-Suzuki suggest, what is imperative is not 
“tolerance,” but challenging the construction of “culture” (identity) as homogenous and 
harmonious.287 It is not simply the recognition of the difference external to the self, but the 
reassertion of the difference subsumed within the category of “Japanese.”288 To engage in the 
discourse of Nihonjinron, culture, race, and so forth is to be “haunted by the ghosts of dead 
theories,” which must be confronted in order to gradually redefine the parameters and 
foundations a nation stakes its claim of identity on.289 And using the framework offered by both 
Bayliss and Morris-Suzuki, and others, for analyzing Zainichi Korean identity, I will proceed to 
analyze hisabetsu burakumin identity. 
Japan’s Invisible Social Minority: Hisabetsu Burakumin and the Struggle for Liberation 
Hisabetsu burakumin “被差別部落民” translates to “discriminated against hamlet 
people” and refers to the group’s historical spatial locality as well as their status as victims of 
discrimination. This is a name that various communities and organizations chose for themselves 
after having been imposed with names such as tokushu buraku “特殊部落” or “special hamlets,” 
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eta “穢多” or “an abundance of filth,” and other names designating their social status.290 Their 
re-appropriation of the term “burakumin” into hisabetsu burakumin carries a political 
connotation and marks it as an important aspect of their struggle against being ignored and 
discriminated against. However, the term “hisabetsu” is an unspecified form of discrimination 
that this paper will attempt to clarify. 
It is prudent to note that there are different forms of social differentiation that societies 
facilitate. The most poignant examples of social differentiation are race, gender, and class. From 
these categories, I think racial differentiation parallels well with how hisabetsu burakumin are 
treated, represented, and identified. There are a variety of intricate factors that further complicate 
the classification of hisabetsu burakumin since differentiation of people into categories is a 
process of social construction. Since there is no “ethnic” difference between hisabetsu 
burakumin and “normal” Japanese people, hisabetsu burakumin are not considered a “true” 
ethnic minority.  
However, the scholar Timothy Amos, in his work, Embodying Difference: The Making of 
Burakumin in Modern Japan, uses the term “social minority” as a way of contextualizing the 
type of category hisabetsu burakumin is.291 As stated before, all types of social differentiation are 
social constructs, and a “social” minority is a product of societal ideology reinforced by an 
actualized reality. That is to say there were no pre-existing conditions that hisabetsu burakumin 
were discriminated against, but that the conditions for discrimination were created resulting in 
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the categorization of hisabetsu burakumin.292 And examining how societies carry out this process 
is vital for understanding how societies utilize constructed groups, or “Others,” to carry out 
specific functions, such as identity creation. 
When discussing hisabetsu burakumin status within a Japanese context, I will use the 
terms pariah, outcaste, and Other as a means of illustrating their social position. Each of these 
terms highlights a state of being that is outside the norm while at the same time indicating the 
reliance of this categorization on the society that constructs it. The interchangeability of these 
terms is useful for conveying the meaning of social alienation as well as showing how Japanese 
society contextualizes hisabetsu burakumin differently throughout time.  
With a definition of discrimination and understanding of ideology in mind, French 
philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of “heterotopia” is also relevant to the issue of hisabetsu 
burakumin discrimination. Flavia Cangia, adopting the concept in her work From Heterotopias 
to Cultural Landscapes: On Reconstructing Buraku Leather Towns into ‘Japanese National 
Spaces,’ discusses the role hisabetsu burakumin communities have as centers of “ambivalent 
meanings.”293 To elaborate, Cangia notes the common theme of associating hisabetsu burakumin 
communities with dirtiness, isolation, disorder, and smelliness in discourses about them.294 
Additionally, Cangia, borrowing the author Kevin Hetherington’s definition, describes 
heterotopias as: 
…sites in that all things displaced, marginal, rejected or ambivalent are engaged, and this 
engagement becomes the bases of an alternative mode of ordering.295 
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This complex description carries a variety of meanings, but to help clarify some of the density of 
the definition, one should note how hisabetsu burakumin and their communities are perceived as 
essentially taboo. To a “homogenous” society, a heterotopia would function, undesirably, as a 
center of cultural and social difference. Simply by being, a hisabetsu burakumin community is 
outside the norm and becomes something that resists the homogenous ideology of the 
mainstream society. This existence of resistance forces mainstream society to engage with this 
“Otherness” and through this engagement, social structures and ideology are challenged and 
forced to change. 
Furthermore, another important concept to consider when discussing the issues of 
discrimination against the hisabetsu burakumin is “untouchability.” This term refers to a societal 
category that designates one group of people as being fundamentally inferior or 
“untouchable.”296 The imposition of values and meanings on people is something that occurs in 
all human societies and is another effect of societal ideology.297 As discussed earlier, societies 
create means of differentiation, and the type of differentiation imposed on hisabetsu burakumin 
parallels with that of groups such as the Dalit of India, the Paekchong of Korea, and several 
others.298 These groups are outcastes and are deemed to fall outside the classical social classes of 
their respective societies. They are associated with filth, impurity, and foreignness, despite their 
similarities, however, each group has its own unique history, challenges, and methods of 
resistance.299 Understanding untouchability is key to analyzing how social minorities are 
constructed and oppressed, and the case of the hisabetsu burakumin will highlight how 
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complicated the consequences of constructed categorizations like untouchables and social 
minorities are. 
Another key concept that will be elaborated in-depth in this paper is French philosopher 
Jean-François Lyotard’s “grand narrative.” Amos’s Embodying Difference presents a 
comprehensive sample and analysis of it, which he termed “master narrative,” building on 
Lyotard’s concept which will serve as my main reference.300 A “grand narrative” is a 
representation and cultural justification describing how or why something is the way that it is.301 
Though this definition is an oversimplification of an incredibly complex term, I think it provides 
a cornerstone from which we can understand how grand narratives are employed by societies to 
explain matters of behavior, law, tradition, social structure, and so forth. An explanation, 
perspective, or world view is ingrained into the justification of whatever is being narrated and 
with it a specific ideology is being perpetuated.302 Thus, when we look at these narratives as 
means of explaining contemporary phenomena, we are engaging a specific ideological 
representation of a subject matter.  
Having elaborated on this theoretical network, the issues of the buraku mondai (“hamlet 
problem” as it is often referred to) will be explored through a process of exploration and question 
raising.303 How is hisabetsu burakumin identity formed and what does it mean to be hisabetsu 
burakumin? What are the problems and benefits of using grand narratives to explain the buraku 
mondai? What roles do or should hisabetsu burakumin communities serve in the fight against 
                                                          
300 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 2-5. 
301 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 2-5. 
302 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 14-22. 
303 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 2. 
Lopez-Duran 67 
 
discrimination? How prevalent are the issues of hisabetsu burakumin discrimination? And what 
contemporary issues do hisabetsu burakumin liberation movements engage in? I do not expect to 
reach conclusions on each one of these points of inquiry, but raising these questions focuses the 
paper on various aspects of this comprehensive issue. 
The Hisabetsu Burakumin Grand Narrative and its Critique 
Hisabetsu burakumin are described as a people whose group identity and discrimination 
have a historical point of origin and continuity.304 Additionally, hisabetsu burakumin live in or 
come from areas of villages, towns, or cities that have been part of a buraku “部落” or hamlet. 
Though the urbanization of Japan and various historical events, such as war and natural 
catastrophes, have caused populations to move and shift around, hisabetsu burakumin are 
represented as having always kept their communities intact through such disasters.305 To better 
understand this simplified description of who the hisabetsu burakumin are, a variation of Amos’s 
“master narrative” will be explored in detail.  
As Amos puts it in Embodying Difference, the historical narrative used for explaining the 
nature and reasons for the discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin is a product of mainstream 
societal interpretation.306 This “master narrative,” as he puts it, was and is used by hisabetsu 
burakumin communities and organizations, the different levels and regimes of Japanese 
government, and mainstream society as a means for explaining contemporary and historical 
issues pertaining to the group.307 The narrative presents the issue of hisabetsu burakumin 
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discrimination as having arisen from both societal ideology and structuring from either pre-
feudal or feudal Japan.308 As a narrative of a people and struggle, the hisabetsu burakumin grand 
narrative focuses on the idea that the hisabetsu burakumin have always been a group constituted 
of Japan’s social outcastes.309 It is a category with a historical point of origin and whose issues 
can be understood via an exploration of the group’s collective history. 
Even though this narrative provides a useful mythology for explaining the origins of the 
pariah group and for illustrating the social ideology behind the discrimination, Amos argues that 
it fails to account for various modern and historical discrepancies.310 The hisabetsu burakumin 
grand narrative purposefully portrays a carefully constructed representation of the struggle of the 
hisabetsu burakumin against societal and institutional discrimination. It relies on the binaries of 
institutional and individual, historical and political, and mainstream and pariah to convey a 
notion of the issue as being rather clear and simple. This narrative is meant to explain the current 
reasons for discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin as well as to justify the existence and 
actions of hisabetsu burakumin liberation organizations and movements. Yet, a representation 
with a political agenda that is used by both oppressor and oppressed will no doubt have its 
inconsistencies and fail to properly account for the actuality of contemporary buraku and 
hisabetsu burakumin issues. 
Any representation of a group, and a master narrative is but one format of representation, 
cannot substitute the reality of their situation. As Edward Said put it in his famous work 
Orientalism, it is important to scrutinize our presentation of reality as a subjective understanding 
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instead of taking it to be an objective truth.311 Parsing the passage presented earlier in the paper 
reveals that Said is challenging the usage of representations as a means for substituting the 
reality of a situation. In the context of the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative, the narrative 
serves as an appeal to history that attempts to define contemporary issues of discrimination and 
identity with a historical interpretation crafted by mainstream society. Given that history itself is 
a human construct, our reliance on the history sanctioned by the society that perpetuates 
hisabetsu burakumin oppression requires careful scrutiny. Even if the oppressed also rely on the 
grand narrative to explain the existential question of their origin, it remains a fallible 
interpretation of events. 
Yet, what exactly is the master narrative and how is it reflective of mainstream societal 
ideology? What are the particular faults with relying on it? And are Amos’s critiques of it valid 
and relevant to our understanding of contemporary hisabetsu burakumin discrimination and 
identity? Without a grand narrative, how are hisabetsu burakumin supposed to understand the 
actuality of their situation as victims of social and institutional discrimination? 
Though there is no exact point of historical origin, pre-feudal and feudal outcaste groups 
such as the hinin “非人” or “non-human” and eta are seen as the predecessors of the hisabetsu 
burakumin.312 The low status of these groups was due to societal ideology imposing a lower 
value on their traditional occupations.313 Their lack of ties to the land, as historically most 
Japanese peasants were farmers, made them targets of discrimination.314 However, even though 
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both groups were considered outcastes, the eta occupied a more rigid and despised social space 
than hinin, who had some social mobility.315 
The eta were particularly known for working with dead animals, corpses, and leather, 
which were seen as especially impure trades.316 Cultural nativist beliefs, such as Shintō and 
Buddhism, also had a role in codifying not only the trades of the eta but the eta themselves for 
what they did.317 Shintō emphasized the importance of purity and there was nothing more 
defiling than death.318 Likewise, Buddhist principles against the consumption of meat and its 
belief in the inheritance of sins from a previous life also condemned the eta.319 Though it is often 
believed that religious beliefs were one of the main factors that initiated the discrimination 
against eta, it is more likely that a social ideology preceded these beliefs. As stated earlier, 
Japanese culture valued farm work as the most important trade for peasants to engage in and 
other occupations were looked down upon.320  
Discrimination against the eta did not remain solely a social phenomenon, however, for 
discrimination was further institutionalized via sumptuary laws enacted by the Tokugawa 
government, after the Sengoku Period (“Warring States Period” 1467-1603).321 These laws 
combined with the social stigma against the eta and hinin communities, codifying and ritualizing 
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discrimination even more strongly into the culture. Traditions, social interactions, values, and 
occupations were fixed by the solidification of social classes.322 
A mixture of ostracizing certain groups of people because of their trades and relegating 
disempowered people to functions deemed tainted perpetuated this system of social distinction. 
However, the stratification among the people was not limited to employment and social status 
but also occupied a material and metaphysical space. Outcastes were kept on the outskirts of 
villages, towns, and cities, living in communities that were adjacent to these traditional social 
centers.323 These hamlets or buraku as they came to be called were ascribed the same values that 
the people living in them were attributed. Thus, the eta villagers came to be designated as 
“burakumin,” though it was a category that extended beyond just the eta and included anyone 
living in or near such locales.324 
To understand this particular relation between space and being, the ontological 
consequences of being hisabetsu burakumin as portrayed by the grand narrative will be explored. 
For, whether hisabetsu burakumin came about because of their historical trades or not, they are a 
group constituted of social outcastes, who were and are still discriminated against. This tradition 
of discrimination has its roots in a social and institutional discourse and ideology of separation 
based on societal function. Religious and cultural beliefs created a system of meaning for how 
first eta, among others, and then hisabetsu burakumin were perceived. Buddhist and Shintō 
beliefs, as cultural practices and as institutional doctrines, reinforced the notion that the work 
carried out by hisabetsu burakumin, and their predecessors, no matter how necessary, was 
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fundamentally impure and defiled.325 This ideology pervaded throughout the whole of Japanese 
society, such that social and religious institutions came to ascribe those characteristics, of 
impurity and defilement, not only to the trades of hisabetsu burakumin, but also to the hisabetsu 
burakumin themselves. 
Discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin became normalized as a result of social and 
religious institutions reinforcing each other’s impositions on burakumin and other outcaste 
groups like them. Yet, below all the physical and tangible expressions of discrimination, the 
ideological process of creating and marginalizing the “Other” was well underway. This is 
reflected in the way values placed on trades deemed defiled or subversive were ascribed to the 
hisabetsu burakumin and hinin themselves, marking specifically the former as being 
fundamentally impure and, by extension, un-Japanese.326 
Reinforcement of social discrimination in the form of the social castes created by the 
Tokugawa government added a political element to the discrimination. The creation of the four 
main social divisions, as modeled on the Confucian structure of the Zhou dynasty of Ancient 
China, saw to the creation of the unique eta/hisabetsu burakumin caste, which lay outside the 
four main divisions.327 Hisabetsu burakumin were bound to their caste and were avoided by 
mainstream society and any interaction with other classes required specific rituals to be 
performed to avoid non-burakumin classes/individuals/spaces from becoming tainted. Though 
social mobility, while limited, occurred during this period in Japanese history, it was even more 
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restricted for hisabetsu burakumin.328 Since, they were ascribed a sense of impurity no matter 
how wealthy, prominent, or useful they were, it was highly challenging to move up the social 
hierarchy, let alone escape pervasive social values.329 The position and values ascribed to 
hisabestu burakumin bodies became an imposed reality that marked the identity and experiences 
of the hisabestu burakumin and their descendants. 
Despite the discrimination that they experienced and the social and legal regulations that 
required them to show subservience to any member of the other four social divisions, hisabestu 
burakumin lived in an odd economic situation. The ideological perspective imposed upon their 
traditional trades inadvertently granted hisabestu burakumin monopolies and this in turn allowed 
some hisabestu burakumin to become economically successful.330 And if they could hide their 
background well, some hisabestu burakumin even escaped their station in life and ascended to a 
higher social class.331 It is important to note that these two advantages and practices are not 
meant to downplay the discrimination suffered by hisabetsu burakumin nor to claim that this was 
a common, accessible reality for all, but instead are meant to highlight the complexity of their 
situation. Given that they were not ethnically or phenotypically different, hisabetsu burakumin 
are not “visibly” discernable from non-burakumin Japanese. Thus, the Tokugawa government 
attempted to establish “visible” markers through the sumptuary laws, but it was possible to work 
around the regulations with sufficient economic power.332 
Yet, despite the potential prosperity afforded to some by their status, hisabestu 
burakumin remained a low-status position. It was completely acceptable, for example, for 
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samurai to cut down hisabestu burakumin with impunity and without real cause.333 It was 
impermissible for hisabestu burakumin to physically touch non-burakumin, lest they pollute 
them, and if contact was made, the non-burakumin would have to perform a ritual purification.334 
Additionally, even if it was possible to hide one’s background, if one were ever outed or 
discovered, the consequences would be very severe. Likewise, the immense psychological and 
emotional stress caused by hiding one’s identity and fearing ever being discovered would 
discourage most hisabetsu burakumin from doing so. The power of discriminatory ideology, 
when enacted via mechanisms of the state and through social ritual, is perpetuated completely 
when the discriminated begin to police themselves according to the rules of their oppressors. 
However, with the fall of the Tokugawa government during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, the Meiji imperial government, influenced by global events, put effort into 
restructuring the whole of Japanese government and society in an attempt to modernize and 
Westernize it.335 The government was prompted to “modernize” by Japan’s vulnerability to 
potential Western intervention and military power.336 Along with the various reformation 
projects, Western discourses were also explored further and influenced the creation of Meiji 
Japan.337 Philosophies and sociological theories about race, society, and nation allowed Japanese 
scholars and government officials to reanalyze and reinterpret the buraku mondai.338 In order to 
                                                          
333 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 40-43. 
334 Herbert Passin, "Untouchability in the Far East," (Monumenta Nipponica 11, no. 3 (1955)): 252-255. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2382914 
335 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 43-46. 
336 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 43-46. 
337 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 43-46. 
338 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 131-135. 
Lopez-Duran 75 
 
compete successfully with Western powers, the Meiji government engaged the issue of hisabetsu 
burakumin discrimination in order to unite its citizenry and move past the archaic feudal 
structures of the Tokugawa Shogunate.339 
In the year 1869, the Japanese feudal caste system officially ended, indicating the 
beginning of the Meiji government’s new social policy.340 In 1871, the new government passed 
the Senmin Haishirei, which sought to give outcastes equal living status.341 In reality, this edict, 
more commonly known as the Kaihōrei, actually proved more harmful to hisabetsu burakumin 
communities than beneficial.342 The lifting of past institutional and social restrictions meant that 
the monopolies over the traditional occupations hisabetsu burakumin were engaged in, were no 
longer in place and this led to a decline in living standards.343 Coupled with this new economic 
reality, hisabetsu burakumin continued to experience discrimination as social norms of 
difference and ostracism persisted throughout society.344 Thus, even if the law granted hisabetsu 
burakumin equal status, the social, economic, and institutional reality of the situation remained 
the same, as did the value impositions on hisabetsu burakumin bodies. These new reforms, fused 
with lack of substantial social change, created the conditions for hisabetsu burakumin 
communities to worsen, instead of improve, and buraku communities remained or regressed into 
slums.345  
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During this time period, however, hisabetsu burakumin began to mobilize into 
movements and organizations that advocated for their rights, fought against discrimination, and 
challenged the government to address the issues their communities were facing.346 Economic 
destitution, poor services in hisabetsu burakumin communities, international interests, and 
pressure from activist organizations pressured the Meiji government to act, but few substantial 
actions were taken.347 With the changes to social structuring, industrialization, and political 
dynamics, hisabetsu burakumin communities were absorbed into the larger growing population 
centers of Japan. Even though their hamlets had historically been adjacent to town, city, and 
village centers, hisabetsu burakumin communities became harder to geographically isolate. This 
process of population integration began during the Meiji restoration and continued after the 
American occupation. Yet, even though hisabetsu burakumin communities became slightly less 
distinguishable, societal differentiation persisted as a result of social ideology, cultural 
codification of discrimination, and policies like the family registry. 
 Family registration is the documentation of one’s genetic and ancestral history and was 
used by the government for the documentation of the populace as a whole for various other 
administrative functions.348 The Meiji government initiated a comprehensive documentation of 
hisabetsu burakumin community numbers, functions, and populations in order to evaluate 
economic potential and labor resources.349 Using family registry, one’s ancestral homeland and 
genealogy were cemented, and since the information was a matter of public record, individuals 
and companies could use registries to determine whether or not someone was from a buraku or 
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was hisabetsu burakumin.350 Despite the various changes occurring during the Meiji period, the 
societal ideology that constructed hisabetsu burakumin as being essentially different from 
“normal” Japanese citizens morphed discursively. These new, subtler forms of discrimination 
manifested as a response to the edicts ending the Tokugawa laws’ “visible” differentiation.351 
In response to the various socio-economic changes and continued discrimination, 
hisabetus burakumin communities began to organize themselves into movements and 
organizations that sought to improve their social lot.352 The most vocal and powerful 
organization of the time, 1922-1942, was the Zenkoku Suiheisha “全国水平社” or “Levelers’ 
Association of Japan.”353 Known for its denunciatory tactics and its strong anti-discrimination 
stance, the Suiheisha proved to be a powerful political and social entity for hisabetsu burakumin 
communities to assert their socio-political relevance.354 Using various communities and wealthy 
individuals’ collective power and resources, the Suiheisha continued to pressure the government 
into initiating more comprehensive projects aimed at destroying various areas of inequality.355 
The poor hygienic conditions of hisabetsu burakumin communities and access to economic and 
educational resources were the main areas of concern for the Suiheisha, in addition to their push 
for anti-discriminatory legislation.356 
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Though the Suiheisha experienced its share of setbacks, an interesting period of time for 
the organization came with the increased militarization of Japan. Given the rise of nationalism 
and militarism, the Suiheisha found itself in an odd position of fighting against ideology that 
sought to categorize its members as being non-Japanese, and therefore susceptible to 
discrimination, or appealing to anti-foreigner sentiments in order to solidify themselves as being 
members of Japanese society. While it is certain that members of the organization were divided 
as to what position they should take as a whole, hisabetsu burakumin continued to push for 
social progress. Though as a result of the national militarism, government control became more 
explicit and rigid, eventually leading to the Suiheisha ceasing its operations around the 1940s. 
Following the end of World War II and during the American occupation, hisabetsu 
burakumin communities once more reorganized themselves to continue fighting against 
inequality. From the remnants of the Suiheisha, former members established the Burakumin 
Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei and henceforth BLL), an organization that closely 
followed the activities and stances of the old Suiheisha.357 However, due to conflicting politics 
and interests, some members were kicked out of the BLL or left of their own accord; these 
individuals formed a new organization known as the Buraku Liberation Alliance (Zenkoku 
Buraku Kaihō Undō Rengōkai, or Zenkairen).358 Though both of these organizations set out to 
fight for the rights of hisabetsu burakumin communities and to eliminate social prejudice, they 
disagreed on the means to those ends. The BLL focused on accusatory tactics, denouncing 
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discriminators and were more militant in nature.359 Zenkairen, on the other hand, adopted less 
aggressive tactics and focused on assimilationist approaches.360  
As the BLL and Zenkairen pushed for the advancement and rights of hisabetsu 
burakumin communities and individuals, the Japanese federal government also enacted a series 
of beneficial policies aimed at eliminating the levels of inequality found in hisabetsu burakumin 
communities.361 Beginning in 1969, the Special Measures Law for Assimilation Projects diverted 
funding to impoverished communities in an effort to reduce illiteracy rates, increase access to 
new public goods and services, as well as increase the welfare of the communities as a whole.362 
These projects continued to be funded until 2002, when the Japanese federal government 
declared that it had accomplished the goals it had laid out in the Special Measures Law.363 
Though hisabetsu burakumin organizations, especially the BLL, requested that the Special 
Measures Law be reauthorized, their request was denied.364 Even though no more additional 
funding was being provided for continuing the programs initiated in hisabetsu burakumin 
communities, the BLL and other organizations recognized the positive impact that the Special 
Measures Law had in reducing community concerns about education, employment, public 
services, and so forth.365 
                                                          
359 Ian Neary, “Burakumin at the end of history,” (New School for Social Research, Spring, 2003), 1. 
360 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 160-162. 
361 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 160-163. 
362 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 160-163. 
363 Ibid., 160-163. 
364 Ibid., 160-163. 
365 Ibid., 160-163. 
Lopez-Duran 80 
 
As a result of these projects, Zenkairen dissolved on March 3, 2004, after declaring that 
“the buraku issue has basically been resolved.”366 Although, the organization’s members later 
formed the National Confederation of Human Rights Movements in The Community (Zenkoku 
Chiiki Jinken Undō Sōrengō or Zenkoku Jinken Ren) to continue fighting against all forms of 
discrimination.367 The Burakumin Liberation League adopted a similar stance and continues to 
fight against discrimination and human rights injustices, though it does not see the buraku 
mondai as having been resolved.368 The BLL continues to stress the importance of passing 
federal anti-discriminatory legislation. 
A Fallacious Narrative and Hisabetsu Burakumin Identity Politics 
So, if the issue of discrimination is not over for hisabetsu burakumin, and I agree with the 
BLL that it is not, then there has to be something problematic with how the grand narrative 
appears to conclude with the government’s projects ending the buraku mondai. In fact, the 
representation of the buraku mondai via the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative fails to account 
for various intricate aspects of hisabetsu burakumin identity, resistance, societal reaction, and so 
forth. For example, why is the notion of historical continuity so assured, despite the wars and 
natural catastrophes that would have resulted in population shifts and movements? Also, how 
complex was the economic reality for hisabetsu burakumin during the period of time when they 
held monopolies over very important and necessary trades? Did the edicts of the Meiji 
government have any beneficial impact on hisabetsu burakumin communities? Furthermore, 
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what does it mean to be hisabetsu burakumin according to the grand narrative? What can be 
gained from understanding the buraku mondai? 
To answer the question of population movements and shifts, Amos claims that hisabetsu 
burakumin communities and members were a lot more fluid and would often move from location 
to location.369 This does not mean that hisabetsu burakumin were more nomadic or traditionally 
migratory, but that as a result of living conditions, discrimination, wars, and other external 
factors, whole communities were often forced or coaxed into moving.370 Given that hinin and eta 
were both treated as outcastes and that any people living in or near an eta village were classified 
as being eta themselves, then it is not unreasonable to believe that the same phenomena occurred 
for hisabetsu burakumin communities later on. As city populations grew during the Edo period, 
hisabetsu burakumin communities and other undesirables were continuously pushed to poorer 
and poorer areas while their old communities were incorporated into the expanding city limits.371 
As a result, Hisabetsu burakumin communities, though located near traditional geographical 
landmarks like rivers or on poor land, have mainly been incorporated into the cities and towns 
that continually pushed them outward.372 
After World War II, American officials introduced land reforms and distributed parcels 
of land to Japanese and hisabetsu burakumin alike, although the latter had historically limited 
involvement with farming as they were often forced to give up any arable land.373 Given that 
Japan was also decimated by continuous American bombing campaigns, portions of the Japanese 
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populace moved around to avoid getting caught up in the destruction.374 Even though new slums 
were created in the years that followed the war, traditional hisabetsu burakumin communities 
had to be re-established and they became populated by immigrants and other non-burakumin 
peoples, like the Koreans, as well.375 The traditional concept of the hisabetsu burakumin as a 
monolithic group that has historical continuity is less than feasible with all these considerations 
in mind. 
The notion of “passing,” or submerging one’s identity with another identity to escape 
unfavorable social positioning, was a viable tactic available to some hisabetsu burakumin.376 
Lack of ethnic and racial makers meant that certain limitations faced by other ethnic/racial 
minorities, did not prevent hisabetsu burakumin from blending into mainstream Japanese 
society. The socialized rituals and sumptuary laws of the Tokugawa period were repealed with 
the rise of the Meiji government and it became even more feasible to hide one’s identity of being 
hisabetsu burakumin or coming from a buraku. As mentioned before, another factor that ties in 
with passing and that complicates the issue of hisabetsu burakumin disenfranchisement is their 
historical economic power. 
With their historical trades being taboo and deemed impure, hisabetsu burakumin were 
able to secure certain monopolies on leatherworking, policing, sanitation, and various other 
undesirable occupations.377 Hisabetsu burakumin were able to gain a degree of political power 
and were in fact important workers, due to leatherworking, during the Sengoku Period.378 
                                                          
374 Ibid., 46-63. 
375 Ibid., 46-63. 
376 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 53-56. 
377 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 40-43. 
378 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 40-43. 
Lopez-Duran 83 
 
Competing daimyō (大名 “feudal warlords”) employed leatherworkers to maintain their armies 
and equip them with necessary tools and armaments for warfare.379 Hisabetsu burakumin 
communities noted for their leatherwork, were employed by powerful daimyo and gained status 
as a vital asset to enlist for any army.380 The end of the Sengoku Period, however, did mean that 
less demand was placed on hisabetsu burakumin communities for producing artifacts of war. But 
the Tokugawa government imposed and facilitated various functions for hisabetsu burakumin 
communities to carry out in order to maintain social order.381 
During the Edo period, the leader of the major kantō hisabetsu burakumin communities 
was known as the Danzaemon and he (always male due to traditional patriarchal social 
organization) was directly enlisted into the service of the Shogun.382 The Danzaemon functioned 
as a means for controlling and redirecting hisabetsu burakumin and other outcaste communities 
into different works on behalf of the government.383 They would often be tasked with jobs such 
as catching criminals, acting as police and executioners, doing sanitation and fire prevention 
work, in addition to their traditional trades.384 Though these various functions gave the hisabetsu 
burakumin a certain degree of political power, their association with impurity and the oppressive 
aspects of the government only increased the resentment they experienced from other classes and 
groups.385 Despite the discrimination they experienced, however, hisabetsu burakumin who were 
                                                          
379 Ian Neary, “Burakumin at the end of history,” (New School for Social Research, Spring, 2003), 1. 
380 Ian Neary, “Burakumin at the end of history,” 1. 
381 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 40-43. 
382 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 40-43. 
383 Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaiʻi Press, 2011), 100-106. 
384Timothy D. Amos, Embodying Difference: The Making of Burakumin in Modern Japan, 40-43.  
385 Ibid., 40-43. 
Lopez-Duran 84 
 
able to accumulate influence, power, and wealth through this system were capable of escaping 
the bonds of being identified as hisabetsu burakumin.386 
Another issue with the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative is that the Meiji edicts that 
abolished class stratification were not able to resolve the issues of discrimination and 
impoverishment in their communities. As mentioned before, the unexpected backlash of such 
edicts was that hisabetsu burakumin communities began to decline with the loss of their 
economic monopolies.387 Even though outsiders began engaging in trades that were deemed 
socially taboo, the main focus of discrimination and association with those trades, and their 
impurity, was still on the hisabetsu burakumin.388 This is partly because the category of “new 
citizen” created by the edicts that was meant to liberate outcaste groups instead simply renamed 
the old feudal dynamic of the Edo period.389 The phrase “new citizen” became a derogatory term 
and members of outcaste groups found themselves only a little better off under the new 
government than they had been under the Tokugawa regime. 390 
Even though the political reality for pariah groups like the hisabetsu burakumin had 
conceptually changed, the social structure of society remained relatively untouched even after 
social classes were made more open to social mobility.391 Despite the enlightenment ideology the 
early Meiji government was perpetuating, the lack of substantial policy reform and funding of 
projects aimed at eliminating issues in buraku meant that hisabetsu burakumin were a vulnerable 
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demographic.392 The Meiji edicts were more detrimental to the group since enlightenment 
ideology and the edicts of liberation were used as counterarguments to any claims of 
discrimination or disparate treatment.393 The rise of nationalism also suppressed open-critique of 
the government, since doing so was considered unpatriotic and un-Japanese.394 Even the 
Suiheisha had to adopt an unsavory stance supporting the nationalistic ideology of the 
government and their foreign military expeditions.395 The fear of being deemed a foreign element 
was even more prevalent during the latter Meiji era given the widespread appeal of Western 
eugenics and racial theory in Japanese discourses by scholars, who sought to justify military 
expansions and imperialism.396 
 The fear of peripheral groups being deemed exclusively “Other” in the fullest sense 
explains why hisabetsu burakumin individuals and communities strove to establish mythologies 
of origin.397 Using these mythologies, hisabetsu burakumin engaged in the process of creating 
their own narratives for explaining and justifying their social and political reality.398 Given the 
rising nationalism, foreignness was one of the biggest markers for discrimination and so 
hisabetsu burakumin communities rejected notions of being foreign and embraced the stance that 
they, unlike other groups, were at least Japanese.399 Meiji scholars were busy reanalyzing and 
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reinterpreting the category of hisabetsu burakumin as a racial identity and explaining how the 
hisabetsu burakumin were sub-human.400 These discourses were founded upon earlier Edo period 
thinking though they were infused with new Western and Japanese ideas. The reformulation of 
societal structure during the Edo and Meiji periods brought with it the need to redefine and 
reorient society’s Others. Having pride in being hisabetsu burakumin was considered a direct 
insult, and one worthy of intense scrutiny, to the idea of Japanese identity, as the two were 
conceptualized as being diametrically opposed.401 As I have argued, the socio-political reforms 
of the Edo and Meiji periods did little to change the hisabetsu burakumin’s association with 
impurity and defilement, regardless of their economic reality or supposed social liberation. 
As I have demonstrated, the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative fails to account for 
various complications and establishes a representation of hisabetsu burakumin that is tied to a 
notion of historical continuity and the discrimination they experienced. Thus, to be hisabetsu 
burakumin according to the grand narrative means: 1) you must have a genealogical or ancestral 
tie to the historical eta community; 2) your ancestors engaged in impure trades that affected their 
social positioning; 3) your liberation was achieved as a result of the Kaihōrei (“Emancipation 
Edict”) and Special Measures Law for Assimilation Projects; 4) you or your family currently 
reside in or have resided in a hisabetsu burakumin community. However, even while 
acknowledging the actuality of their discrimination and the affects that it has had on their 
communities and bodies, hisabetsu burakumin are an invented social category if their identity is 
based on the grand narrative. I have analyzed a variety a reasons for why this type of identity, 
multi-faceted as it might be, cannot possibly work as a foundation for hisabetsu burakumin 
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identity. To reiterate, I am not arguing that the hisabetsu burakumin identity does not have 
ontological consequences or that it has not affected the social reality of the people identified as 
hisabetsu burakumin, but that the grand narrative’s representation renders hisabetsu burakumin 
identity as unrealistic.  
First, the notion that one’s ancestry or genealogical history can be determined empirically 
is not possible even with the extensive documentation of the family registry dating from the 
Meiji period. This is because populations shift as a result of migration, war, natural disasters, or a 
host of other potential reasons. Passing further complicates this idea since there is no phenotypic 
distinction to give “visible” markers of difference. Social matters, like family genealogy or 
homeland, could be forged and hidden with sufficient wealth and social power, which some 
hisabetsu burakumin had. And even though there had historically been a distinction between the 
hinin and eta groups, the close proximity between these two pariah groups often led to common 
association and conflation. Since the political and social systems neglected outcastes until the 
Meiji era, there was no real, sustained effort by the government to carefully track and record who 
was what in outcaste communities across Japanese history. This became even more problematic 
following World War II, when hisabetsu burakumin communities became populated by 
immigrants and other non-burakumin individuals, who were of the same socioeconomic 
standing. Even if one were not originally from a buraku community as soon as one begins to live 
there, then one is associated with being hisabetsu burakumin and is regarded as such.402 
Since hisabetsu burakumin communities still engage in historical trades as well as newer 
occupations of similar social standing, it seems more reasonable to assume that this aspect of 
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hisabetsu burakumin identity remains consistent. However, there are non-burakumin Japanese 
and foreigners who engage in the exact same lines of work and who also experience similar 
levels of discrimination as the hisabetsu burakumin.403 The issue is that spatial meaning is 
assigned to locations near or related to hisabetsu burakumin communities. The notion of filth and 
impurity is no longer simply associated with the trade, but with the location in which the work 
takes place. Aside from the actual geographical space and the assumptions that such places are 
filthy and smelly, the workers in those areas occupy a virtual space, thereby imbibing in the same 
imposed values.404 Discrimination against any work/trade deemed filthy or impure is not a 
remnant of ancient social ideology, but is an ingrained and adapting cultural code. Religious 
notions in Japan have always been a mixture of cultural beliefs, ritual behavior, and reflect, 
rather than create, social ideology. It is not because of the Shintō belief concerning purity and 
impurity or the Buddhist condemnation of killing life and eating meat or its concept of sin that 
hisabetsu burakumin discrimination persists. 
Ideology is pervasive and it is difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate in its entirety from 
a society. The cultural codification of discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin means that 
even if the “historical” markers, i.e. sumptuary laws, occupation, and living space, are no longer 
existent or as tangible, the values imposed on their very bodies have not changed. Even the 
seemingly “radical” transformation of society during the Meiji Restoration failed to eliminate the 
social values marking hisabetsu burakumin individuals and communities as impure and 
inherently un-Japanese. If the newer institutions and societal structures simply repurposed the 
old value systems, reorienting them slightly toward new aims, then it follows that the ideology 
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for differentiating members of society has remained more or less intact. New discourses do not 
necessarily negate or eliminate preceding ideologies, thus a society conceptualizing itself as 
enlightened might at the same time ascribe to a notion of racial hierarchy or social ordering 
based on perceived social positioning. 
In regards to the economic reality and the living conditions of the hisabetsu burakumin 
communities after the American occupation, the elimination of material barriers did not equate to 
an elimination of metaphysical barriers. Despite the benefits that hisabetsu burakumin 
organizations and communities received as a result of the Special Measures Law, the issue of 
discrimination did not disappear along with the material issues of illiteracy, poor education, poor 
public services, and inefficient and hazardous community planning.405 Instead the elimination of 
these issues masked the more important discourse of ending discrimination against hisabetsu 
burakumin. If one were to conceptualize the issue of hisabetsu burakumin as being grounded in 
their economic conditions, i.e. historical occupation or unequal living conditions, then it would 
not be irrational to conclude that the elimination of these obstacles would result in the end of 
discrimination. The grand narrative itself is oriented around this outlook, for the solution to these 
issues is increasing material resources available to hisabetsu burakumin communities.406 Yet, 
despite the material improvements to hisabetsu burakumin communities, and they are now 
distinguishable because of their high living quality, the reality of the situation is that the buraku 
mondai is far from resolved. 
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As discussed earlier, living in a buraku community, a community designated as being 
historically a hisabetsu burakumin community or populated highly by hisabetsu burakumin, 
itself is a marker for being identified as hisabetsu burakumin. But since we know that population 
shifts and immigration have led to non-burakumin peoples moving into hisabetsu burakumin 
communities, this notion is likewise fallacious. Given the process urbanization and as a 
consequence of the Special Measures Law, hisabetsu burakumin have greater mobility, allowing 
them to move from locations traditionally associated with them to all parts of Japan.407 Without 
the easily accessible means to “out” individuals, and because they have no visible signifiers of 
difference, would it be accurate to say that individuals who have no markers of being social 
minorities can still identify as hisabetsu burakumin? Without the grand narrative, the framework 
entailing the contemporary, post- American occupation, collective experience of the group must 
serve as the foundation for hisabetsu burakumin identity.  To compound the complexity of this 
identity, the grand narrative only described a generalized historical continuity for hisabetsu 
burakumin communities of the Kansai and Kanto regions of Japan. Certain hisabetsu burakumin 
communities located further west or northeast of these regions had different experiences and 
some experienced little to no discrimination at all.408 Therefore, a new framework for 
understanding contemporary hisabetsu burakumin identity must be analyzed in order to properly 
outline the nuances and distinguishing features of this social minority.  
However, this critique is aimed at deconstructing the identity formulated by the grand 
narrative and is not a criticism that regards hisabetsu burakumin discrimination as negligible or 
fictitious. I intend to open the discussion as to what constitutes hisabetsu burakumin identity as I 
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can only speculate that changes in social ideology and the efforts of hisabetsu burakumin 
organizations have made some changes to how society depicts and understands hisabetsu 
burakumin. Currently, hisabetsu burakumin organizations like the BLL are having difficulty 
attracting younger members into their ranks as social activists, despite their policy expansions 
and outreach programs.409 This potentially indicates that younger generations are not as worried 
about issues of discrimination as older generations, that they are ignorant of societal 
discrimination, that they no longer experience significant discrimination which would prompt 
them to become members, or organizations simply do not adhere to the concerns of younger 
generations. This generational gap also means that hisabetsu burakumin identity is construed 
differently by younger generations. 
In the case of older generations, they might remember the times when they had to fight 
for the improvement of their communities and the rights they enjoy today. Since younger 
generations are removed from those experiences and struggles, they become less engaged with 
the reality and tradition of struggle. To them, being hisabetsu burakumin no longer carries the 
same connotation that it once did and it might even be seen as a burden or unneeded add-on to 
their own personal identity. Given that traditional social impositions are harder to pin as 
populations and landscapes change, younger generations might be able to escape the labels and 
difficulties that come with being identified hisabetsu burkaumin. Even during the height of 
hisabetsu burakumin activism, hisabetsu burakumin liberation movements were divided over the 
ultimate end of their organizations.410 Should hisabetsu burakumin become an obsolete category 
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that no longer describes people outside of a historical context or discourse? Or is being hisabetsu 
burakumin something that should be embraced and asserted to resist cultural hegemony? 
Hisabetsu burakumin culture is a numinous topic that various authors, such as Amos and 
Cangia, alluded to but never truly define. Hisabetsu burakumin communities, such as the ones in 
Osaka, link their culture to the historical works hisabetsu burakumin were known for, such as 
leatherworking and specifically taiko drum making.411 However, an appeal to history is a 
problematic basis for a diverse group like the hisabetsu burakumin, who carried out a wide 
variety of functions and trades. The difficulty of encompassing a group of people as varied as the 
hisabetsu burakumin is further complicated by the fact that even issues of common struggle 
varied from location to location. Marginalized people are not monoliths. However, could the 
tradition of resistance provide some foundation for hisabetsu burakumin identity? This neither 
ties the identity to the historical grand narrative nor to the disparate discrimination experienced 
by communities, but rather to a tradition (not rooted in history but of modern conception) of 
struggle against discrimination. While this offers us only a rudimentary framework for 
understanding hisabetsu burakumin identity, it shifts away from the representation created by the 
historical narrative that appeals to continuity, uniformity, and resolution. The continued 
resistance by hisabetsu burakumin, and their national, regional, and local associations, to 
codified social rituals, discrimination, and cultural hegemony is what constitutes a feature of the 
social minority’s identity. 
This type of identity requires an understanding of changes to cultural context that are not 
accounted for by appeals to history. And I speculate this only to be the barest of outlining 
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distinctions for what it means to be hisabetsu burakumin. It is possible that re-appropriated 
features of hisabetsu burakumin culture, while recognizing community variance, can also add to 
a sense of identity? Though it is difficult to see specific traditions, behaviors, and ideas 
constituting a major feature of a collective identity, for that is the process of national/hegemonic 
identity making, things are not so bleak. If collective identity is constructed on a foundation of 
internal variance, and not as monolithic, then it is quite possible that being hisabetsu burakumin 
might entail more than universal traditions or characteristics. Yet, how are hisabetsu burakumin 
who are not explicitly engaged in struggles against discrimination able to identify as hisabetsu 
burakumin? 
 Since, the above framework for hisabetsu burakumin identity rests upon the tradition of 
resistance, then those who are beneficiaries of resistance to discrimination, i.e. younger 
generations, are also identifiable as hisabetsu burakumin. Though this seemingly identifies any 
person who joins the resistance against discrimination as hisabetsu burakumin, the very fact said 
person had the choice to join, a privilege normally reserved only for out-group members, 
indicates that they are not hisabetsu burakumin. Likewise, regardless of one’s personal 
commitment to the struggle for liberation, someone who is not a child and/or hides/rejects their 
identity as hisabetsu burakumin will continue to be so, for social impositions do not always align 
with personal self-identification.  
However, if one identifies as hisabetsu burakumin, then it means one recognizes the 
tradition of resistance that has been, and is being, engaged against societal ideology and 
structures which relegate people to pariah status. Regarding oneself as hisabetsu burakumin is 
neither obsolete nor equivalent to holding onto an archaic notion, rather, younger generations 
should actively identify themselves with the struggle against discrimination that continues to 
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affect their lives and shape their cultural context. Though one might consider the possibility of 
eliminating the need to identify as hisabetsu burakumin as the means for younger generations to 
think that the last vestiges of discriminatory ideology will be overcome. Despite the controversy, 
the idea that the ultimate aim of social movements is to establish societies in which difference no 
longer determines one’s social, political, or economic reality, though possibly naïve, is a 
legitimate notion individuals and organizations mobilize for nonetheless.  
Assessing current social conditions, however, demonstrates that such a post-
discrimination society is still a far-distant ideal. Hisabetsu burakumin are still discriminated 
against in areas such as employment and marriage, since concerned employers or families use 
illegal address books or private detective agencies to investigate the backgrounds of potential 
employees or spouses/in-laws.412 Even if a hisabetsu burakumin individual lives in a non-buraku 
community or does not even engage in a “traditional” occupation, the values of impurity, filth, 
and foreignness are still ascribed to their very body. Though these practices were more common 
during the Meiji period, and up until family registries were closed to public access, they 
resurface since the demand for the information persists. A famous incident relating to this type of 
discrimination involved a notorious address book known as "A Comprehensive List of Buraku 
Area Names" (Tokushu Buraku Chimei Sōkan).413 An Osaka-based firm secretly compiled a 
book listing all the names and locations of hisabetsu burakumin settlements and showing how to 
compare them to people’s addresses so one could determine if a person is/was hisabetsu 
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burakumin or a buraku resident. Though the book was eventually banned from publication, it 
continues to be printed illegally and can still be found circulating in underground markets.414 
Another notable instance anti-hisabetsu burakumin discrimination discussed by Amos is 
an experience Uramoto Yoshifumi had, known as the “Mass Discriminatory Postcard Affair.”415 
This incident involved a perpetrator who believed in the hisabetsu burakumin grand narrative 
and who considered hisabetsu burakumin to be a polluted and subversive element affecting 
Japanese society.416 Over 400 individuals and groups, including the Tokyo Meat Market (a 
company unaffiliated with hisabetsu burakumin) and Uramoto, were sent threatening and 
demeaning postcards.417 Though the Tokyo police was able to find and apprehend the suspect, 
who was charged with fines and a prison sentence, the hate crime shows how discriminatory 
ideology still persists in Japanese society. Despite the size of such incidents, large discrimination 
cases are rare and most minor cases are undocumented or are much more subtle in nature. And I 
highlight these two larger cases not to argue that discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin 
normally occurs on such a scale, but that discriminatory ideology rooted in traditional discourses 
has not disappeared, despite popular belief and the attitudes of younger generations. 
The Creation of Heterotopias and Assertion of Hisabetsu Burakumin Identity 
It for the reasons explored above that hisabetsu burakumin communities and museums of 
human rights, established by their organizations and other anti-discrimination social movements, 
serve an important function as centers of resistance. Hisabetsu burakumin communities and these 
museums are the heterotopias Cangia outlined in her work “From Heterotopias to Cultural 
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Landscapes: On Reconstructing Buraku Leather Towns into ‘Japanese National Spaces’.”418 
Since heterotopias are sites of “Otherness” and aspects societies often overlook or ignore, they 
function as the means for forcing the greater society to engage in discourses of social 
difference.419 When human rights become a prominent discourse in Japan, hisabetsu burakumin 
organizations took the opportunity to seize its language and international attention to bring light 
to the buraku mondai and other liberation struggles.420 With the Japanese federal government 
wanting to gain influence within the United Nations and thanks to the pressure brought by 
international attention, resistance organizations were able to promote the enactment of a series of 
programs aimed at educating mainstream Japanese citizens about issues of discrimination.421 
However, the government had its own programs that often conflicted with the messages 
conveyed by hisabetsu burakumin organizations, for the government was trying to portray the 
solution to human rights violations and discrimination as solely depending on people adopting 
attitudes of understanding and tolerance.422 However, hisabetsu burakumin organizations and 
other resistance movements argued that a degree of government intervention, in the form of 
legislation and social structuring, was required to resolve the discrimination issues and 
injustices.423  
One of the most famous centers of resistance and human rights education is Liberty 
Osaka, which has heavy ties with the Osaka Burakumin Liberation League chapter and is located 
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in a hisabetsu burakumin community.424 The museum displays a series of different exhibitions 
visitors can engage detailing various social struggles and injustices that have occurred 
throughout Japanese history, including women’s rights, the “comfort women” issue, 
discrimination against victims of the atomic bombings, a hisabetsu burakumin exhibit, and much 
more.425 Locations like this continue to challenge societal norms and narratives concerning 
discrimination and injustices while assisting activist movements in educating fellow citizens 
about contemporary social issues.  
The struggle for ending discrimination against hisabetsu burakumin is far from over, 
even if it appears as if though the discrimination against them gradually diminishes over time, it 
will only come about because of the efforts made by people to destroy and resist discriminatory 
social practices and ideas. Social change does not occur without reason and the reason for the 
continued fight against a seemingly “resolved” problem is that it was never truly solved. I do not 
think that social issues for untouchables can simply be fixed with the dissipation of the 
discrimination against them nor through their integration into the society that marginalizes them. 
Only through the creation of an independent collective identity and system of values and 
society’s recognition of a group’s struggle can the process for moral repair begin. I will offer no 
concrete conclusion or framework for moral repair, a complex concept that I have only begun to 
explore. Though I do speculate that continued efforts by marginalized peoples and heterotopias 
will continue to make strides toward challenging social ideologies and cultural hegemony. 
However, it rests upon a newly motivated generation to take up the tradition of resistance for 
change to become a reality. 
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While untouchability appears like a domestic issue, the struggles for human rights and 
social liberation affect people everywhere around the world. I am aware of my appeal to a 
universal humanistic perspective here, however, I find it a moral imperative to be invested in the 
liberation of oppressed and marginalized peoples around the world. How exactly can 
international scholars and activists become engaged in the movement? What are the ethics that 
scholars should abide by when analyzing and establishing representations of groups? And how 
can our understanding of untouchability as a societal process of “Othering” assist in fighting 
against cultural hegemony in Japan and elsewhere? While these are questions to consider further 
for the study of marginalized communities in Japan and elsewhere, I will not explore them in-
depth in this paper though I find them worth intense consideration. 
Without an essentialist characteristic, common experience of discrimination, genealogical 
bond, unifying political ideology, or historical continuity, how is the modern hisabetsu 
burakumin community supposed to define itself? Though the answer to this question is far from 
simple and requires serious consideration in its own right, I think it is possible to suggest a 
conceptualization similar to our previous analysis of Japanese and Zainichi Korean identity. 
Understanding the context that facilitated the creation of a common “invented tradition” or 
“imagined community” is crucial for recognizing how hisabetsu burakumin identity is formed. 
While the restrictions of the grand narrative appear to give a more definite explanation of 
hisabetsu burakumin identity, I think it is the duty of individuals who identify themselves as 
hisabetsu burakumin to question the traditionally imposed values and parameters of identity. 
Accepting the grand narrative is tantamount to perpetuating Japanese cultural hegemony and the 
very mechanisms of oppression marginalized groups are subjected to. To reiterate Morris-
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Suzuki, an individual who engages the traditional discourses of identity must wrestle with the 
ghosts of dead theories.426 
The assertion of a newly “invented” notion of identity is not disingenuous and is 
potentially less problematic. Individuals will continue to define the parameters of their identity 
and associate themselves with various facets of their culture and society. The recognition of 
marginalized peoples’ struggles for self-determination and liberation is necessary for 
deconstructing cultural and social hegemony. To transform not only physical and geographic 
spaces into sites of difference, but to embody difference as individuals is to resist internalized-
colonization and engage in the creation of a new discourse of identity politics. 
Scholarship and Identity: A Future Outlook 
 Having explored the relation between Japan’s hegemonic concept of identity and 
marginalized identity, I will briefly expand the discourse of this paper to the ethics of 
scholarship. What exactly are the duties of scholars? How are we to assess the proper ethical 
framework for engaging in the representation of other cultures and peoples? Through what 
means, and to what extent, can we recognize and mitigate our own biases and assumptions? And 
what is the role of the scholar in challenging cultural hegemony? 
I think it is important for all scholars to recognize the potential biases and assumptions 
we express in our research of other groups and cultures. And though I do not want to conclude 
this paper with empty moralizing or the assertion of some grandiose standard of ethical 
scholarship, I am concerned with making sure that the identities and cultures of others are 
represented respectfully and as truthfully as possible. It is for this particular reason that I agree 
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with Lie in asserting that Japan is a multiethnic nation, for conceptualizing it as such recognizes 
and reifies the struggles and identities of the marginalized peoples who live in the shadow of 
Japanese hegemony. The mechanisms of oppression that silence and transform groups into 
peripheral minorities operate in all parts of the world. Understanding the nuances of different 
cultural forms of stratification and discrimination can assist scholars and activists alike in 
resisting oppressive and subversive ideologies and social structures. The research and analysis 
that I have carried out these past few years have not culminated in a concise conclusion nor have 
they offered me definitive answers to the questions I have raised throughout this paper or during 
the course of my research. I have encountered many more intricacies and nuances that have 
prompted even more questions, though I will pursue those lines of inquiry in future projects. For 
now, I only hope that the struggles and identities of the hisabetsu burakumin and Zainichi 
Koreans will become more prominent in public discourses in Japan and elsewhere, thereby 
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